ı	I	1
1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS	
2	TYLER DIVISION	
3	NETWORK-1 TECHNOLOGIES, INC. )	
4	DOCKET NO. 6:13cv72	
5	Tyler, Texas ) 12:59 p.m.	
6	HEWLETT-PACKARD COMPANY, ET AL May 14, 2018	
7	TRANSCRIPT OF POST-TRIAL MOTIONS HEARING	
8	BEFORE THE HONORABLE ROBERT W. SCHROEDER III UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE	
9	ONTIED STATES DISTRICT SOBEL	
10	<u>APPEARANCES</u>	
11	FOR THE PLAINTIFF:	
12	MR. GREGORY DOVEL	
13	MS. CHRISTIN CHO MR. JONAS JACOBSON	
14	DOVEL & LUNER 201 Santa Monica Blvd., Ste. 600	
15	Santa Monica, CA 90401	
16	MS. ANDREA FAIR	
17	WARD, SMITH & HILL, PLLC 1507 Bill Owens Parkway	
18	Longview, TX 75604	
19		
20		
21	COURT REPORTER: MS. SHEA SLOAN	
22	FEDERAL OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 211 W. Ferguson	
23	Tyler, TX 75702	
24	Proceedings taken by Machine Stenotype; transcript was	
25	produced by computer-aided transcription.	

```
FOR THE DEFENDANTS:
 1
 2
     MS. JENNIFER DOAN
 3
     MR. JOSH R. THANE
     MR. KYLE AKIN
 4
     HALTOM & DOAN
     6500 Summerhill Road, Ste. 100
 5
     Texarkana, TX 75503
 6
     MS. NATALIE A. BENNETT
 7
     MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
     500 North Capitol Street, NW
     Washington, DC 20001
 8
 9
     MR. HERSH H. MEHTA
10
     MCDERMOTT WILL & EMERY LLP
     444 West Lake St.
11
     Chicago, IL 60606-0029
12
     MR. MARK S. OUWELEEN
13
     BARTLIT BECK HERMAN
       PALENCHAR & SCOTT LLP
14
     54 W. Hubbard St., Ste. 300
     Chicago, IL 60654
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
```

## PROCEEDINGS 1 2 THE COURT: Please be seated. 3 Mrs. Schroeder, please call the case for us. THE CLERK: Case No. 6:13cv72, Network-1 4 5 Technologies, Inc. v. Hewlett-Packard Company, et al. THE COURT: Announcements for the record. 6 7 MS. FAIR: Good afternoon, Your Honor. Andrea Fair on behalf of the Plaintiff. Here with me Mr. Greg Dovel, 8 9 Ms. Christin Cho, and Mr. Jonas Jacobson. We are ready to 10 proceed at the Court's --11 THE COURT: Good afternoon, welcome. MS. DOAN: Your Honor, for HP, Jennifer Doan Josh 12 13 Thane, Kyle Akin also from our office, Mr. Hersch Mehta from McDermott Will & Emery and his partner Natalie Bennett, and 14 15 then Mr. Mark Ouweleen from Bartlit Beck, and Tim Foster our 16 able paralegal. 17 THE COURT: Welcome. 18 MS. DOAN: Also in the courtroom, Your Honor, is 19 Ms. Vaishali Udupa and Mr. Grant Ritz, also in-house for 20 HP. 21 THE COURT: Good afternoon, everybody. Thank you 22 for coming to Texarkana. 23 We are here this afternoon for argument on two 24 motions, the Plaintiff's motion for new trial on

infringement, which is Docket No. 98; and the Plaintiff's

25

motion for judgment as a matter of law and new trial on invalidity, which is Docket No. 99.

We are also, tomorrow, hearing the bench trial on inequitable conduct, and I know that the parties had filed a joint motion to adjust the deadlines with respect to tomorrow's bench trial, including changing some of the deadlines related to that. So that motion will be granted.

And then I know that there was a motion filed by the Plaintiff asking us to limit the inequitable conduct trial tomorrow to any theories raised by the Defendant in its complaint and in the pretrial order.

I understand that the Defendants have filed a response to that. We will take a look at that. And then I have suggested to the Plaintiffs that they will have an opportunity to reply if they so desire.

So I think that completes my preliminary comments.

Unless the parties have anything that we need to address before we begin argument on the motions, we will do that now.

MR. DOVEL: Good afternoon, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Good afternoon.

MR. DOVEL: Your Honor, we are asking the Court to grant JMOL that the patents -- that the claims asserted in the patents were not obvious, and the patent is valid.

Your Honor, as you are aware, the question of obviousness is a question of law, so what do we do with the

jury's finding on that?

As the Federal Circuit held in the Richardson case, it says: We assess the record evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict winner. But this does not mean that we are free to abdicate our role as the ultimate decision maker on the question of obviousness. That decision remains within our province.

So the Court has not yet ruled on obviousness.

That is one of the things we are asking the Court to do is to issue a ruling that as a matter of law the asserted claims were not obvious.

Now, the first point I am going to address, Your Honor, relates to the Fisher System. As an overview, we argue in our papers that there are five important fundamental flaws in their obviousness case, any one of them means as a matter of law the claims were not obvious. I am going to spend time on four of those today.

The first is the Fisher System. To assert the Fisher System they have got to establish that it is prior art. They don't dispute that. They also don't dispute that their only assertion that it was prior art is under Sections 102(a) and (b) where they assert it was prior art because it was in public use. The Fisher System, they assert, was in public use.

And just to be clear, I put on the board the

Federal Circuit's controlling authority in the Woodland case often cited by the Federal Circuit about what this means.

And they say under Section 102(a): In order to invalidate a patent based on prior knowledge or use, that knowledge or use must have been available to the public. The language "known or used by others in this country" means knowledge or use which is accessible to the public.

It is not enough to establish that the Fisher

System was used. They have got to establish with evidence,

clear and convincing evidence, that that use was public. It

was accessible to the public.

So I am going to spend just a minute discussing with Your Honor what the law tells us what it means for use to be public and not public.

In the Dey case the Federal Circuit held that: If members of the public are not informed of and cannot readily discern the claimed features, the public has not been put in possession of those features. To be a public use it has to be used where members of the general public can readily discern the claimed features.

Public use in the Clock Spring is an example of a case where the Federal Circuit found there was public use. In that case there was a demonstration of the product in public. There were representatives of competitors who watched the demonstration. That made it accessible to the

public.

Now, what are examples where the use is not public as a matter of law? Here are two that are directly on point, Your Honor. We have got them on our Slide 6. First is the Invitrogen case. The Court held that the fact that Invitrogen secretly used the cells internally to develop future products that were never sold, is insufficient to create a public use.

Using a system internally to accept future products is not a public use. That is not a use that is accessible to the public. That is an internal use.

Another case that provides great guidance to this Court, it is another ruling by the Federal Circuit as a matter of law, is the Allied Colloids case.

In that case, Your Honor, the -- there was a use made of this -- this claimed set of chemicals that were used in a sewage system. And the way they tested them was to take them to a public municipal sewage system at the City of Detroit, their plant, and put the chemicals in and do tests on it.

And even though that was something that was open and available, the Federal Circuit held as a matter of law that is not a public use. Why not? The tests were not observed by anyone other than Colloids' employees, the Federal Circuit said.

Representatives of the City of Detroit were there at the municipal plant, but no witness testified that anyone other than Colloids' employees conducted or observed the experiments. As a matter of law that is non-public use.

If there is no witness that testifies that the use was observed or conducted by outsiders by members of the general public, it is a non-public use.

Now let's turn to the evidence here. What is evidence -- what is HP's evidence of public use? In fact, the only thing they point to is evidence of use, not public use.

Here is from their brief, Your Honor. It is on our Slide 7. They say that: Fisher testified that 3Com actually implemented powering an access device using PoE, and then they cite seven lines of testimony. And here are those seven lines of testimony. We have it on the board now.

In this testimony Fisher says -- was asked: Did you actually implement powering an access device using Power over Ethernet technology in 1996? And he says: Well, we probably had it working in '95. This was the second generation that was done in '96. But, yeah, we probably had it done.

Your Honor, this is testimony from Fisher to using the system. But there is not a word of mention that the use was publicly accessible; that it was open to the general

public; the members of the general public attended. There is not a single word, clause, or sentence from which you could infer public use in this testimony. That is it, Your Honor. That is the sole testimony they rely upon for Fisher.

What they don't do is cite any of the testimony where Fisher describes in the details of what they were doing. What was he using it for? And the reason they don't cite that, Your Honor, is because Fisher consistently described that the purpose of his using it was non-public. It was for internal development of a system at 3Com.

Here are the words he used. He said it was for research or development. He said this was a prototype. There was hardware that was in development. The use was in order to test it. It did not go to product. 3Com exited the space. All of this testimony describing what the use was is consistent with this, Your Honor.

This is every clause in the transcript, the trial transcript, where he describes why he was using it and how he was using it, for research and development, a non-public use. That is Fisher, Your Honor.

Fisher was the only witness they called who was around at the time who could provide any testimony about the use. They have no testimony, and they provided no documents showing use. That's it. The Court should grant our motion as a matter of law that Fisher was not in public use, they

haven't proven it; therefore, Fisher is not prior art.

Now, in addition, they said our expert testified about this, Dr. Neikirk. But, Your Honor, Dr. Neikirk was not there in '95 or '96. He wasn't a witness to anything. He can't testify as a percipient witness. And if he testifies as an expert, he can't simply give a conclusion. Conclusions from an expert are given no weight.

What is it that they rely upon from Dr. Neikirk?

Here it is. I have reproduced that portion of the brief so

Your Honor can see it. Here is the testimony they rely upon

from Neikirk.

QUESTION: Dr. Neikirk, was Mr. Fisher's system, was it in public use?

ANSWER: Yes, I believe it was.

Your Honor, that is a classic example of a pure conclusion. There is no articulated reasoning. It is simply, yeah, I believe it was. But he had no basis to articulate as to why there was a public use because there was literally no evidence of public use. All he could say was, yeah, I believe it was in public use. That conclusion as a matter of law fails.

The Federal Circuit's Upjohn case, for the determination of obviousness there must be factual support for an expert's conclusory opinion. Lack of factual support for expert opinion going to factual little probative value.

Such conclusory expert testimony cannot support an obviousness conclusion. That is the holding of the Federal Circuit in Duke University. You cannot employ mere conclusory statements.

In ActiveVideo the Federal Circuit again held, the obviousness testimony by the Defendant's expert was conclusory and fatally unsupported. He never provided any factual basis for his assertions. Therefore, they are disregarded as a matter of law, Your Honor. That is what they point to from Neikirk.

Now, they to point to one other thing. They say, well, we presented evidence of the hardware. We had the actual hardware in Court. And here it is. I presented it on our Slide 12. This is a photograph of it. But it provides no evidence of public use, Your Honor. The fact that there is hardware sitting on a desk says nothing about whether a use of it in '95 and '96 was open to the public.

Now, HP they say, well, one of the circuit boards had a copyright notice, a copyright symbol on it "c" with 1996. It said: All rights reversed. And I have reproduced that on Slide 13.

And this is what they argued to Your Honor when we brought our JMOL before the verdict. We requested the Court to give us judgment as a matter of law because they had no evidence of public use. And HP made exactly one argument.

reproduced it here on the screen for Your Honor, and the argument is simply a false assertion. The sole argument was that the system had copyright etched into the machine that said 1996 indicating that the Copyright Office had reviewed it and that it was available.

What their assertion is that, well, we had this copyright symbol, that means we registered it. To register we had to send the system to the Copyright Office, and they used it.

There was no evidence of that, and all those inferences, in fact, are wrong as a matter of law, Your Honor.

Let me go through that.

First of all, as a matter of law, putting the copyright symbol on something does not imply registration.

We quote the cases, we quote the relevant statutes that state unequivocally that registration with the Copyright Office is not required before adding the symbol on a work.

So putting that symbol doesn't mean that HP registered it. If it had been registered what you would see is an application and registration certificate. There was no evidence of an application or registration certificate. HP certainly would have provided that if there was one.

The only inference that can be reasonably arrived at is it was not registered. There is no evidence of

registration. Moreover, if they had sought to register that circuit board, as a matter of law they would not have sent the circuit board in because the Copyright Office does not accept tangible articles like circuit boards. That is not how you register them. You send in a photograph of it. They have no ability to accept it.

And if 3Com for some reason had sent that circuit board in to try and register it, it doesn't mean that there was any public use. The Copyright Office is not going to take that circuit board and put together a system and fire it up and run it. The fact that there was a copyright symbol is not evidence of public use as a matter of law. That is the sole argument they made pre-verdict on this, and it is simply wrong.

Now, the next point I want to address, Your Honor, is a misstatement of the law that they make in their brief.

I want to address this. We explain it in our brief, I think, very well, but I want to address it because there shouldn't be any confusion on this. I want to point out that a district court did get confused on this and did get reversed by the Federal Circuit. We don't want that to happen here.

What they quote in their response is this: Any use of the claimed invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction, or obligation of secrecy to the inventor, is a public use.

And they say then that Fisher's use of the system with others at 3Com would, therefore, be a public use. What they are suggesting is this language from this Federal Circuit case means that if Fisher and his colleagues at 3Com are using it, that makes it a public use because they are not under any obligation of secrecy to the inventor of our patent, to the inventor of the '930 patent, Mr. Katzenberg.

But the Federal Circuit has held that that is simply the wrong way to understand what this law is about. And they reversed the Federal Circuit for that -- or reversed a district court who did exactly that. This is in the Dey case. I reproduced on the screen now the relevant portion from that Dey case.

And the Federal Circuit said: The district court's decision was the result of misconceptions about the reach of Section 102. It says: The district court's findings were based on language from our cases stating that public use includes any use of the claimed invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction, or obligation of secrecy to the inventor. It is the exact language that HP quoted.

And the Federal Circuit then held: Those statements are not meant to apply to third-party use cases. That is, if Katzenberg were using the invention before the filing of the patent, then there would be a question of were

other people under an obligation to him? But that is the not the case here. We have a third party that is purportedly using the invention, a third party being 3Com and Fisher.

As the Federal Circuit went on to hold in Dey, even in the case of third-party uses, being accessible to the public still requires public availability. It is not enough that Fisher and 3Com made a use. Their use must have been made available to the public.

As the Federal Circuit held: When the alleged public use is performed by an unaffiliated third party rather than the inventor, such use must still be publicly accessible. That is from the 2015 Delano Farms case.

So their quoting of that language and misusing it, is wrong as a Federal Circuit law. The Federal Circuit has directly addressed it and reversed the district court who followed that approach. They have to show that any use by Fisher at 3Com was accessible to the public. That's what would make it a public use.

Fisher's use at 3Com is not a public use, not unless they have evidence that members of the public attended the demonstrations, attended the use, and that they had made it accessible to the public.

Now, HP in surreply they say, well, there was no evidence that the Fisher System was confidential or secret. There is two problems with this one. The first one is a

legal problem. This reverses the burden of proof. For them to establish that Fisher's prior art, they have to show by clear and convincing evidence that the use was public. It is not enough for them to show a use. They have the burden to show a public use.

We don't have to come in and say, well, you showed a use, now it is our burden to show that it was confidential.

No. HP, as the proponent of the argument that the patent was invalid because of Fisher, has the burden of proving that there was a public use.

Here is the Federal Circuit cases that we cite on that point directly. The Defendant had the burden to show by clear and convincing evidence that the inventors placed their invention in public use.

Here is another case, Tone Brothers. The party asserting the public use bar has the initial burden of showing by clear and convincing evidence facts which support the existence of a public use. They haven't done that, Your Honor.

The second problem, Your Honor, is that the only evidence that was in the record is evidence from which you could infer that it was confidential. As I showed before, Fisher's testimony about the use was that it was for research or development, they were developing a prototype of a product.

The only reasonable inference is that HP would keep that confidential. HP is not in the business of developing products and inviting their competitors in to see them before they release the product. That is not ordinary business behavior, and there is no testimony suggesting that HP decided while developing this product, conducting research and development, preparing this prototype, that they decided to invite the public in or invite competitors in or invite a journalist in to write an article about it. None of those things. No evidence of public use.

The other piece of evidence that bears heavily on this, Your Honor, is the patent application that 3Com filed on May 29th, 1997. To file that patent application, 3Com necessarily did not engage in any prior public use that could act as a bar to their own patent.

So prior to May 29, 1997, the only reasonable inference is that 3Com did not engage in a prior public use. They kept it confidential. And when was it that Mr. Fisher testified his use was at 3Com? Unequivocally, '95 and '96. So Fisher's use in '95 and '96 was non-public. There was no evidence, no evidence of a public use of the Fisher System. All evidence pointed to the fact that it was a non-public use by 3Com in developing a product.

There is yet another hurdle they have got to overcome, Your Honor, and that is corroboration. It is not

enough to come in when you are talking about facts that are this old and have one witness testify about it.

Here is the Federal Circuit in Finnigan talking about the requirement of corroboration that: Testimony concerning invalidating activities can be unsatisfactory due to the forgetfulness of witnesses, their liability to make mistakes, their proneness to recollect things as the party calling them would have them recollect them. For that reason corroboration is required.

They had one witness on this subject, Fisher. They didn't have two. As a matter of law, they lose. There was no corroboration.

The Federal Circuit in Finnigan specifically held that corroboration is required on the issue of public use. A witness's uncorroborated testimony is equally suspect if he testifies concerning the use of the invention in public or use the invention in public, 102(b).

In that particular case they reversed. They said: What we are left with is Jefferts' testimony concerning his alleged public use. Such evidence is insufficient as a matter of law.

So that was a case where they actually had a witness who did provide testimony about a public use. The Federal Circuit said as a matter of law that fails. It wasn't corroborated.

They need to put on evidence of public use, and then they need to do it twice. They need two forms of evidence, any evidence and corroboration. They don't have any, Your Honor.

Let me show you what their purported corroboration is. This is from the trial transcript. I put it on the screen. It is our Slide 27.

Dr. Neikirk was asked: Has it been corroborated here that it was in public use?

Here is what he says: Yes, Dr. Fisher told us this morning that they built a system, they plugged it into the network at their offices and used it.

So this is not corroboration. This is Fisher himself talking about it. This is not corroboration of Fisher. And it is not about a public use. This is Fisher describing a non-public use.

They plugged it into the network at their offices and used it, not plugged it into a public space and demonstrated it to the public, not invited miscellaneous third parties to come in and observe them using it, that they plugged it into their network in their offices and used it. That is not corroboration, and it is not testimony about public use.

Now, because there was no evidence of public use, the Court is required as a matter of law to conclude that the

Fisher System was not proven to be prior art. That means the Fisher System has to be eliminated and not considered in their obviousness contentions.

And what they are left with then is the Fisher patents, Woodmas patent, and Chang patents. That combination, Your Honor, they are estopped on. We moved for JMOL of estoppel specifically on this before the verdict. And they should have been estopped from presenting that.

The statute 35 USC 315 provides that they are not able to raise before the jury any grounds that they raised or reasonably could have raised during the IPR, anything they reasonably could have raised.

Well, they knew about these grounds, these patents, and could have raised them during the IPR. We know that because here is their invalidity contentions dated December 19th, 2012. And on them they identify Chang and Fisher and Woodmas. They were fully aware of those references in December of 2012.

And this Court's holding on a similar motion earlier is controlling on this. As this Court ruled and I will quote the Court's own order, HP disclosed each reference in its invalidity contentions on December 19th, 2012.

Therefore, HP reasonably could have raised each invalidity ground before the PTAB. That means they are estopped on those invalidity grounds.

If they are estopped on those grounds, that is the end of their obviousness case. Fisher is not prior art. The remaining patents they are estopped on. JMOL should have been granted pre-verdict, and it should be granted now. As a matter of law, their obviousness case fails.

Now, Your Honor I want to turn to the next part of our motion, which is it fails for additional reasons, in that they failed to prove necessary elements in order to establish obviousness.

They have argued that we waived these. I am going to address the waiver after I address the merits of these because understanding the waiver will be easier in light of understanding exactly what the issues are.

The first missing element is low level current.

They didn't establish in their combination that it had a low level current, applying evidence, using evidence that applied the Court's construction.

In order to satisfy this requirement of proving that their prior art had a low level current, they would need to have an expert testify and apply the Court's construction and demonstrate where each part of the construction was satisfied in the prior art reference.

They didn't offer any such testimony. The Federal Circuit has held, this is an example, in the Aspex case, this is not a one of the rare cases where the invention is so

simple that expert testimony is not required. The party asserting invalidity has the burden of introducing such evidence, such expert testimony. Expert testimony is required for a technical patent like this.

In the Koito case the Federal Circuit reversed the district court. Why? Because the district court erred in concluding that explanatory testimony from the expert relating to the prior art reference of the patent was unnecessary. It would be error for this Court to do so as well. They have to introduce explanatory testimony that relates to the prior art reference to the patent.

The Federal Circuit held that general and conclusory testimony does not suffice as substantial evidence of invalidity.

Same thing in ActiveVideo, and I urge Your Honor to look at ActiveVideo. The facts are very similar in this regard. As they point out, the testimony provided by the expert was conclusory and lacked sufficient technical detail. For that reason it had to be disregarded, justifying JMOL.

Now, on this issue of low level current, the Court required that it must be a non-data-signal current that is sufficient to begin start up of the access device but that is not sufficient to sustain the start up.

Their expert, Dr. Neikirk, at no time applied that construction except when I asked him about it -- and you will

see that testimony later -- when he admitted it wasn't found in their references.

But in their testimony that they point to he doesn't say, aha, here in Woodmas this is a current that is sufficient to begin start up of the access device. He doesn't even make that conclusory assertion, much less show it.

There is no testimony from Neikirk showing that the Woodmas current -- that was the one that they alleged was going to satisfy this -- there is no testimony that it was sufficient to begin start up of the access device. Without that testimony, under Federal Circuit law, their obviousness case fails as a matter of law. They need explanatory testimony applying that by their expert. Their expert didn't do it. They failed as a matter of law.

What HP relies upon instead -- and I have reproduced it from the brief on Page 57 -- is the barest conclusory testimony from Neikirk where he says: The Woodmas is clearly teaching us a great deal about low level currents, and I'll go ahead and check off low level current. We'll see that it's truly the low level current as construed by the Court when we look at that combination.

All he is doing is saying, yeah, I found the low level current, but he at no point applies the Court's construction and says, aha, this is a low level current. We

simply have his bare conclusions. And those bare conclusions as a matter of law as the Federal Circuit has done in four other cases, those bare conclusions have to be disregarded. They are not sufficient evidence. They are given no weight.

Now, in addition when he gave us conclusions, they were always qualified. He always threw in, well, there would be a low level current if we used -- if we do this the way that Network-1 did in its infringement theory or the way Dr. Knox did in his infringement theory.

And what those qualifications were referring to -- and I will go to our Slide 60 now -- is that Dr. Neikirk asserted that the theory that Network-1 was using was that it merely has to be a current that is used in a detection process. And he described that as an erroneous construction.

And it certainly would be. We can compare it to the Court's construction, and it is not the same thing at all. If you merely establish that a current is used in a detection process, that would not establish that it was sufficient to begin start up.

And for that reason they never asked Dr. Neikirk to go further and try to actually apply the Court's construction before the jury.

In closing argument HP gave us a telling admission on this very point. They said that: This construction applied by Neikirk was just sufficient -- was just current

sufficient to go through the detection circuitry. That's completely different to what Judge Schroeder says. Judge Schroeder says it has to begin start up of the access device. Not current sufficient to go through the detection circuitry.

So that is an admission that this erroneous construction is not the same thing as the Court's construction. It is completely different as to what Judge Schroeder says. Judge Schroeder requires that it be sufficient to begin start up of the access device. That is not mentioned at all in this erroneous construction.

Now, what happens if we actually applied the Court's construction? The evidence is undisputed on that, Your Honor. Dr. Neikirk himself admitted what would happen if we applied the Court's construction and looked for a current that would be sufficient to begin start up.

And here is his testimony on Slide 68, and this testimony alone should be conclusive on the issue. He was asked this: In your opinion, does Woodmas disclose or teach a low level current using the Court's definition of low level current?

His answer: The Court has recommended a construction of low level current, that it's a non-data-signal current that is sufficient to begin start up of the access device but that is not sufficient to sustain start up. I have applied that exactly as it is stated by the

Court, to Woodmas.

And as I pointed out quite clearly in the Footnote 128, it's my opinion that Woodmas's current of 15 milliamps does not start up. So hence, no, Woodmas is not disclosing that low level current as required by the Court. They needed to provide expert testimony applying the Court's definition to Woodmas. They didn't do it.

I asked their own expert to apply that. And he said unequivocally, Your Honor, this testimony could not be clearer. I have applied that construction as exactly as it is stated by the Court, and Woodmas is not disclosing that low level current as required by the Court.

Moreover, Your Honor, I asked Dr. Neikirk in a series of eight questions to explain exactly why it was that the prior art did not disclose a low level current. And I put -- to help him explain it, I put in the front of him the Figure 1 from Woodmas, which I have got on the board now, and asked Dr. Neikirk about it.

And he explained that Woodmas system is going to deliver a current, this 15 milliamp current, from something called the power delivery unit over to the power reception unit. And those are illustrated on this diagram. That is where the current goes between.

Now, Dr. Neikirk also explained that over on the far right here in Box 16, that is where we have these remote

devices, what would be the access devices; a camera, headphones, a microphone over there.

And he was asked this -- going to our Slide 64 -- by delivering this 15 milliamp current, does that mean that the current is sufficient to begin the start up of the connected remote device?

ANSWER: No. In my opinion, it doesn't. The remote device is not started up by that current.

Does the detection current in Woodmas, does it reach any of the items in box 16?

His answer: The lower power current provided by the power delivery unit to the power reception unit, no. The current does not flow onto the rest of the circuitry.

This current doesn't even -- in Woodmas, doesn't get over to the accused devices. A current can't start up an access device if it doesn't even reach it. And Dr. Neikirk explained the current doesn't even get to the access device so, of course, it doesn't start it up.

He confirmed this question: You would agree that there is no current that reaches any of the items in Box 16? Yes, I would, yes.

Does not reach the microphone?

And I went on to identify them specifically.

The current does not reach this camera, correct?

That's exactly how it is designed, yes.

Correct. 1 2 Does not reach the headphones? 3 Correct. The Woodmas current doesn't reach any of the remote 4 5 devices. There is no begin start up. 6 And then he concluded. He was asked this question, 7 which is directly on point, Your Honor: Do you have any basis for concluding that the '930 patent claims are obvious? 8 9 And here is his answer: Given that the Court said 10 that the low level current must be sufficient to begin start 11 up of the access device, I could not find that element in the 12 art that I used. My opinions would not have all of the 13 elements required for an obviousness conclusion. It is his 14 own admission at trial that if we actually apply the Court's 15 construction, it is not there. 16 Do you have any basis to conclude that the '930 17 patent is obvious, I asked him? 18 He says this: I cannot conclude that it is 19 obvious. 20 OUESTION: It would be valid. ANSWER: It would be valid. 21 22 They don't have any evidence from an expert or from 23 any witness saying that there is a current in any of their 24 prior art that is sufficient to begin start up of an access

device. Their expert didn't testify to that. He testified

25

just to the opposite. Our expert agreed with it. The testimony is uniform on this point. Therefore, there is no evidence supporting an essential element of their obviousness case.

Without prior art that has a low level current, one that is sufficient to begin start up, they are missing a fundamental part of the claim; and, therefore, they cannot satisfy their obviousness case, as their own expert admitted. Without that element, he has no basis to conclude that the patent is obvious.

And on that point, again, here is another just -- I will say -- I will use the word "devastating," a devastating admission from HP itself. This is HP's own comment in closing argument about that, comment about Dr. Neikirk.

And, finally, he had to say, look, I don't know the element would be met. And if it's not met, yes, it would be valid. But that's using Judge Schroeder's claim construction. Using his analysis and the way he's applying it, these patents are valid, yes, they are. And he went through a thorough analysis, and it's his opinion.

That is the only way to interpret this testimony.

There is no way to interpret this testimony that there was a current that was sufficient to begin start up in the prior art.

Now, that's low level current. I am going to

address two more missing elements on this -- for this motion.

The next one is secondary power source. Secondary power source is an element that had the longest construction of any of the elements. Among other things, it required driving -- the identification of driving points for the secondary power source and for a main power source.

So in order to establish that there was a secondary power source, they would need testimony from an expert identifying the secondary power source in the prior art and explaining why -- where its driving points are and why those driving points are physically separate from the driving points of the main power source. Those are highly technical issues. That is not something a lay person can figure out on their own.

Without that testimony, again, an important part of their obviousness case disappears, and we are entitled to judgment as a matter of law.

What evidence did they put on that? None. Your Honor, their expert Dr. Neikirk did not even mention driving points. It doesn't show up anywhere in his testimony.

Moreover, he did not even make the conclusory assertion that the secondary power source was found anywhere in the prior art.

On direct examination I'm going to show Your Honor

his sole mention of the word "secondary power source." It's when he was identifying what elements were found in Claim 6 that he would have to prove. He says: I started with Claim 6. I tried to pull out the key pieces again so we can look for those. There's a main power source, secondary power source, low level current, sensing, and controlling.

The sole time he even used the words "secondary power source" was when he said, this is what we have got to show. This is what we need to prove. But then he never went on to actually prove it.

The only time he discussed secondary power source was on cross-examination when he admitted it was not present. I put on the screen his testimony.

QUESTION: In your testimony you didn't identify that the Fisher System teaches a secondary power source: Is that true?

ANSWER: Not as construed by the Court, no, it does not.

His only testimony, even conclusory testimony about secondary power source was that it was not found in the prior art he used.

Now, HP in their brief, they say, well, he did mention it in a demonstrative, and they reproduce a demonstrative in their brief. But they don't cite to the record for that, and the reason is that demonstrative was not

in the record.

In fact, we cite Fifth Circuit and Eastern District cases holding that demonstratives are never a part of the record. Charts of this nature are not themselves evidence.

They are not evidence. You have to look at the testimony.

And, moreover, even that demonstrative itself, if it had been admitted, would not have done anything because it does not mention anything about driving points. It does not apply the Court's construction.

So there was no evidence of secondary power source. They needed testimony from an expert. Their expert didn't apply it, did not supply that testimony. When asked on cross-examination, he admitted it was not present.

The third missing element is main power source.

Now, for this element, Your Honor, the claim requires a single power source, a single power supply that does two things. It supplies power to the data node, power to the switch, and also is for delivering a low level current from said main power source.

So one power source does both things. Dr. Neikirk never identified in the prior art a power source that did both of these things.

In HP's brief they say the following: Again, they point out the fact that Neikirk simply identified that there was one piece of prior art that had a power source that would

do one thing, power the data node, and then a different piece of prior art would power for the other function, but no power source did nothing.

They say: For example, the Chang patents, the

Fisher System, and the Fisher patents disclosed a power

source supplying power to a data node. Well, that is true.

But that is not a main power source. You need a power source

that does both things. Supplying power to the data node is

not a main power source.

And then they say: And the Woodmas patent disclosed delivering a low level current to the access device. Well, the detection current from Woodmas was not a low level current, as we just saw. Moreover, that current was not provided from a power source that also provided power to a data node, so it couldn't be a main power source.

Now, the reason they didn't have their expert testify about it is because he had admitted in his own expert report that it wasn't in the prior art. Here is -- from his expert report. And for the combination of Fisher, Chang, and Woodmas what he does is you can see here he refers to -- he says: See the discussion and citations to Fisher in view of Chang. So he just incorporates what he has done on Fisher and Chang for main power source.

If we turn to that, here is what he says: Fisher in view of Chang does not disclose this element of Claim 6,

main power source. In Fisher and Chang no power source performs both of the functions; i.e., one, supplying power to the data node. And, two, delivering a low level current to the access device.

The reason they didn't ask Dr. Neikirk to testify that there was a main power source in their combination is because he found just the opposite. In his report he put a footnote in admitting that it was not there.

All right. So they are missing three elements -we also demonstrate in our brief that they are missing the
motivation to combine. That was simply conclusory. And the
Fisher System is not prior art. That eliminates on five
different bases their obviousness case.

Now, they say that the basis relating to missing elements, that that was waived. That wasn't mentioned in our JMOL. But they are simply not applying the correct law on that, Your Honor. The correct law was set forth by the Federal Circuit in the Orion case.

In that case the Federal Circuit, as they held in that case, the Fifth Circuit construes Rule 50(a) liberally such that adequacy of a motion depends on the context in which the motion is made. And a cursory motion can be sufficient if it is clear from the context that neither the Court nor the non-movant's attorneys needed any more enlightenment about the movant's positions on those issues

and that is exactly the case here.

Network-1 and the Court were well apprised of our positions on these issues, and I am going to walk through the evidence demonstrating that. And our evidence on this is actually undisputed, Your Honor.

First of all, there is no dispute that we timely moved for JMOL for lack of evidence of obviousness. We moved that HP's entire validity case should be rejected as a matter of law; that there is not sufficient evidence from which any reasonable jury could conclude that the patent is obvious.

Moreover, we had unequivocally identified for HP the elements that were missing from its prior art combination.

Dr. Knox, our expert, had identified those in his expert report. He said expressly that the key missing elements from Dr. Neikirk's proposed combination of Fisher, Chang, and Woodmas included main power source, secondary power source, and delivering a low level current.

And he explained in detail why they were missing, the very things that happened at trial. He said, for example, for secondary power source, Dr. Neikirk fails to identify the claim secondary power source as defined by the Court. Dr. Neikirk does not address the part of the Court's definition that refers to driving points, doesn't identify it.

Then, Your Honor, HP's own expert had admitted

before trial that these elements were missing. In his report, for example, a quote from his report admitting that the Woodmas current does not cause the start up. He admitted in his deposition, and his deposition testimony was played in front of the jury at trial, he admitted that Woodmas does not disclose or teach a low level current.

He admitted that his prior art does not teach a main power source that does both of the things required of the main power source.

So HP was under -- there is no mystery about what was missing. We pointed out, and HP's own expert admitted it.

Then on cross-examination, Your Honor, we pointed it out again. We had Dr. Neikirk admit that these elements were missing. When we concluded with our cross-examination of Dr. Neikirk, there could be no doubt that they understood that a missing element was low level current, as Dr. Neikirk had admitted that he hadn't found it. The same with secondary power source in cross-examination, Dr. Neikirk had admitted he didn't identify it.

In addition in the Orion case, they pointed out one of the factors to consider, part of the context is that the final jury instructions contain specific, detailed instructions as to both anticipation and obviousness so that the Defendant would know that they needed to -- that both

parties would know they needed to meet those elements.

Well, that was the case here as well, Your Honor. There were detailed instructions on anticipation and obviousness -- and I will go to our Slide 46 -- including instructing the jury specifically that the details of the Court's construction of secondary power source and low level current would need to be met.

So HP was fully on notice that they would need to present proof of those elements; that the jury would be told that they needed to look for those elements.

Your Honor, just as you held in the Adaptix case, in that case the oral JMOL on obviousness consisted of the following: There's not specific evidence to determine obviousness. That was seven words, yet Your Honor held that was sufficient to preserve the issues. Why? In light of the context. Because the other side knew that the invalidity challenges were sufficiently developed, and the other side was fully on notice of the issues concerning validity. There is even more evidence of that here.

We put HP on notice before trial and throughout the trial of the exact issues. There was no mystery when we stood up and said insufficient evidence of obviousness is what we were talking about. They knew exactly what we were talking about.

The final factor on this waiver is this one, Your

Honor. As Your Honor held in Adaptix, in considering the context we have to consider if greater specificity would have resulted in reopening the case.

And in that case, Adaptix, the other side made no claim in the briefing that it would have sought to reopen its case to provide additional evidence for its invalidity arguments had Adaptix been more specific in its oral motion.

The same is true here, Your Honor. There is no claim by HP that if we had been more specific in our motion, they would have then moved to reopen the case. And that is for a very good reason, Your Honor. Their expert had admitted, as we just showed, that they couldn't put on more specific evidence on those elements.

He concluded in his expert report and in depositions that they couldn't prove those elements; they couldn't prove low level current, they couldn't prove main power source, for example. As a result they simply couldn't have put on more evidence, and they've made no claim in their briefing that they could have.

And, finally, Your Honor, an additional factor here is that Your Honor had given the parties an additional 25 minutes. HP, instead of using that time to try and put on a better validity case, used it for other things, and they ran out of time at the very end of the case even with that additional 25 minutes.

So if they moved to reopen the case, not only would they have not had any evidence they could have put on, they didn't have time in which to put that evidence on.

Your Honor, there was no waiver here. We moved before the jury verdict, before the jury went out to deliberate for JMOL on obviousness because they had insufficient evidence.

HP and the Court were fully aware of the issues. All of the documents that I pointed to where HP was put on notice about our contentions, were submitted to the Court. They were in the Court record. There was no question about it when we concluded our cross-examination, what elements they were missing.

So for that reason there was no waiver. And with no waiver, as a matter of law their obviousness case fails.

I will finish with one final thing, Your Honor. This is certainly the most important motion I have ever argued. All motions are important to clients, but this motion is vital to Network-1. The '930 patent is an important asset of Network-1. It is a public company. Findings that these claims, especially these independent claims are invalid, is very fundamental to Network-1. There is nothing that is more important. I can assure Your Honor that no matter which side loses this case, there is going to be an appeal.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

separately, Your Honor.

What I have wanted to point out here, Your Honor, is that the reason you should rule our way is the Federal Circuit law is crystal clear. You will be affirmed if you grant JMOL our way. But if you don't, there is Federal Circuit cases, four of them we have cited, where the Federal Circuit reversed the district court that accepted evidence like this. They don't have evidence that is sufficient to withstand JMOL. Your Honor should grant our motion. Unless there are any questions, I will stop here. THE COURT: Thank you. MR. DOVEL: Thank you. THE COURT: Let's take a short recess. (Recess was taken at this time.) THE COURT: Please be seated. Ms. Doan. MS. DOAN: Your Honor, we obviously oppose the Plaintiff's motion for JMOL on the invalidity issues. We had prepared our comments, I think, for the entire motion with respect to JMOL and for the motion for new trial. I am not sure if Mr. Dovel is splitting up his argument for both. am happy to proceed with all of it or just a portion of it. I just want to make sure I am responding to the right thing. MR. DOVEL: We are addressing those motions

MS. DOAN: Then we will stop at the end of that.

Your Honor, with respect to -- I would like to start with Mr. Dovel's last comment with the plea to the Court to please set aside the jury verdict in the Eastern District of Texas because they will take care of this Court, and they are going to take it up anyway.

Defendants. This is the first time that Network-1 has ever tried this case. And what they are asking you to do -- to a jury verdict. And what they are asking you to do is to set aside the jury verdict in the Eastern District of Texas that ruled for the Defendants based upon all of the evidence in the record, not based upon the expert reports that Mr. Dovel was reading from at the end, which are not in evidence in front of the jury except for, I think, a few paragraphs that he actually showed with respect to Dr. Davis. Those are the only two.

But with respect to the verdict that was given,

Your Honor, there is several things that could have happened
here. They just didn't. And the jury went with the

Defendant.

For example, this is a general jury verdict.

I am so sorry, Your Honor. I have some technical issues on this.

(Pause in proceedings.)

MS. DOAN: I will keep going, Your Honor, until they get it clear.

With respect to the renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law, the Fisher System was corroborated. There is clear evidence of that. The Fisher System was also in public use, and the standard that is set by the Fifth Circuit is not — there is lots of different types of public use, and they are citing public use as in public demonstration. And that is not what we are advocating here is for public demonstration.

The second -- the third reason, Your Honor, is the Plaintiff's estoppel arguments fail completely here because they were not preserved in a 50(a) motion.

And, finally, Plaintiffs waived the remainder of their arguments under the current Federal Circuit law of Shaw and the HP cases. The jury -- the jury considered and rejected secondary considerations and every element was established.

Let's talk about first the renewed JMOL motion and why it should fail under  $50\,(b)$  .

First, like I said a minute ago, this is a general invalidity verdict. The Plaintiff could have asked for specific interrogatory questions here. They did not propose those. They have never asked those. This is a general verdict, and it is based on obviousness. And all of the

evidence that came into this case showed by clear and convincing evidence that each of these elements was made and was met in the prior art, and the combination of the prior art with respect to the Fisher System, Fisher patents, Chang patents, and Woodmas.

And, as you know, the verdict must be affirmed unless the evidence points so strongly or overwhelmingly in favor of one party that the Court believes reasonable persons could not reach a contradictory conclusion. That is just not what is happening here.

Instead what is happening is that Network-1
believes that the evidence should be reweighed by this Court.
The evidence has been weighed by this jury. They have heard all of the evidence here with respect to what Dr. Neikirk said; with respect to Mr. Dovel's cross-examination of Dr. Neikirk; with respect to Mr. Dovel's cross-examination of Dr. Davis; and with respect to all of the evidence that we put on with respect to Dr. Neikirk, Mr. Godici; and importantly let's start with the very first day, the very first witness, Corey Horowitz, the CEO of Network-1.

Corey Horowitz told this jury that he had already said 15 years ago in 2003 that when he was talking to Merlot that there is a risk that the detection scheme is an obvious solution thereby rendering the '930 patent invalid. And we went on to ask him a separate question making sure he was

talking about the '930 patent. And he said: Probably yes.

Not only was that his testimony, we also introduced a document, DX27, where he is specifically talking about all of the problems with the '930 patent. And one of the large bullets, No. 3, with respect to Mr. Horowitz's memorandum and statements that came before this jury the very first day, prior art and obviousness are still issues that might affect validity. There are several proprietary solutions pre-802.3af, and their impact is unclear.

And as this Court will recall, we discussed different propriety solutions with respect to the proposals that were presented to the IEEE and Dave Dwelley's testimony, et cetera.

Then Mr. Horowitz went on to say: Moreover, there is a risk that the detection scheme is an obvious solution thereby rendering the patent invalid.

Mr. Horowitz and Network-1 knew 15 years ago that the '930 patent may be held to be invalid, and there was clearly a risk with respect to that. They had given lots of licenses to various people. I think they introduced 24 or 26 in front of the jury. They had written, as the Court will recall, over 350 letters asking for different companies to license. And, of course, not everybody licensed, as we talked about, with respect to -- Apple comes to mind. There were several others that did not license as well.

But they introduced -- this isn't a case where they were -- somehow withheld these various licenses from coming in front of the jury. He introduced these licenses the very first day, and Mr. Dovel opened on it telling the jury that -- signaling to the jury that everybody else has licensed this; therefore, this patent is valid.

But that is not the law. And it never has been the law. And he has known for 15 years that if he ever was pushed actually to trial that there is prior art out there that may render this invalid and obvious.

Next slide, please.

Let's talk about the corroboration, the points that Mr. Dovel raised. First of all, with respect to the Fisher System, it is definitely corroborated.

Next slide, please.

As the Court knows, the Federal Circuit law is that physical, documentary, or circumstantial evidence or reliable testimony from individuals other than the alleged inventor or an interested party, may corroborate. And this is not what Mr. Dovel was saying, that somehow 3Com is using the invention of Mr. Kasowitz [sic] and Deptula.

The Fisher System was definitely corroborated. We don't just have Mr. Fisher giving testimony up there by himself. He actually brings the second generation product from 1996. And goes through it and shows it with the jury.

As the Court will recall, we then gave it to the jury to show certain parts. Then again the Fisher System was corroborated through Dean Neikirk's testimony, and, again, he showed how the Fisher System worked. And, again, different parts were shown to the jury. So the Fisher System is corroborated not only through Mr. Fisher's testimony but also this system itself.

Here we have Mr. Fisher also showing there is a specific date on the second generation, and it is copyright 1996. Now, what Mr. Dovel wants to say is that, yes, but you didn't show me the additional evidence where it is actually registered with the Copyright Office. That is not required. What is required is some evidence. It has got to be clear and convincing evidence, but there is always more evidence.

We could have shown that. We could have presented evidence from someone else that used it. We could have done this to show additional evidence. But that is not required, not to set aside the jury verdict. Some evidence that supports that. And there is clear and convincing evidence that the jury had in front of it.

And we -- and Mr. Fisher also talked about the specific Fisher patents, as the Court will recall there were three Fisher patents and a European patent on the system itself.

So this is not the type of case where he is talking

about -- and I believe he used the Finnigan case saying that -- yes, the Finnigan where we had to show there was something else going on besides the inventor testimony.

And if the Court will recall in Finnigan and in Rosco we clearly distinguished those cases, those are two cases where anticipation is the invalidity theory there, not obviousness. So it is one prior art reference, not multiple prior art references. And there is only the inventor that is testimony -- that is testifying.

He has no product with him in Finnigan and Rosco.

He has no drawings. He has no other patents. Here you have all of these things. This is clearly corroborated.

Next slide, please.

And Dean Neikirk, Dr. Neikirk also answered the question, and the question was: And has it -- referring to the Fisher System -- been corroborated here that it was in public use?

Exactly the testimony that Mr. Dovel said that we did not have in the record. It is clearly in the record.

Corroboration in public use. And Dean Neikirk said: Yes.

Dr. Fisher told us this morning they had built a system, they had plugged it into the network in their offices, and used it.

Dr. Neikirk also goes on in his trial testimony and talks about this phone call that he had with Dean Neikirk --

with Mr. Fisher -- Dr. Neikirk and Mr. Fisher, and talked about specifically that he told him it was in public use, what was going on at the time, and how he developed it, et cetera. The jury heard all of that testimony. Not just from Mr. Fisher and his testimony but also from the phone call from Dean Neikirk. It wasn't like he just sat there and listened to it and was able to opine on it further.

So we have of the Fisher System corroborated, and we actually put it into the combination of the Fisher, Chang, Woodmas combination. And Dean Neikirk specifically talked through how the Fisher System and what it did with respect to the combination, and he went through all four of the parts that were shown when it was corroborated; being the access point, main power source -- sorry, Your Honor.

There were four elements that were shown with respect to the Fisher System, and I -- my mind just went blank. I'm so sorry. It's the access point, main power source, a data node, and the data signaling pair all were shown with the Fisher System. And we went over that in painstaking detail in the trial testimony of Dr. Neikirk.

Next slide, please.

So what we have on the corroboration is not only the actual hardware of the system itself. We have pictures of the system as well that are labeled by Mr. Fisher. We have Mr. Fisher's testimony where he is actually holding the

system and showing how it matched up with the patents and what it specifically did. We also have Dean Neikirk taking the system, going through it and showing how each of these elements — four elements were met with respect to the eight elements that had to be met on the '930 patent, Claim 6.

And then we also have the patents themselves. He showed evidence where each of these four elements is met in the patents themselves. So the Fisher System is clearly corroborated under the current Federal Circuit law.

Now, what else did he say with respect to corroboration? That's all he said. Corroboration of public use, he cites Finnigan and Rosco. But Finnigan and Rosco are clearly inapposite for the reason that we discussed before.

And what was the jury instructed on? You specifically instructed the jury not on just, hey, as long as Mr. Fisher says it, it is good enough. But, no, documentary or other physical evidence that is made contemporaneously with the inventive process is the most reliable proof that the testimony has been corroborated. That was in their final jury instructions.

Here we not only had the inventor testimony, we also had documentary testimony, drawings, and patents that supported it, and we also had the actual system itself of which 58 pictures now exist for DX500, Your Honor.

There is no doubt that the evidence is

overwhelming. It doesn't have to be overwhelming. But it was corroborated.

The Fisher System was also public. And let's talk about this public testimony, public use testimony and what evidence there is and what the actual case law is in the Federal Circuit because it is not what Mr. Dovel says it is.

Public use. Whether a public use has occurred is a

mixed question of law and fact. And under Barry vs.

Medtronic, the inquiry is characterized: A mixed question of law and fact given to the jury without a special verdict -- which the Plaintiff did not request here -- without a special verdict form delineating the questions of fact, the jury's conclusion must be upheld unless the jury was not presented with substantial evidence to support any set of implicit findings sufficient under the law to arrive at its conclusion.

Here they did not ask for special interrogatories. It is a general jury form. And they found that, indeed, this element is met.

Go to the next slide, please.

There is testimony of public use. Dr. Neikirk said, as we have discussed before: Dr. Neikirk, was Mr. Fisher's system, was it in public use?

Yes, I believe it was.

What is this belief based upon?

His conversations, his testimony, and what he has seen with respect to the product itself with the specific date on the product.

The Fisher System was in public use, as we know, on the silk screen and also on the radio, all rights reserved, copyright 1996 with respect to 3Com.

Next slide, please.

Public use includes any use of a claimed invention by a person other than the inventor who is under no limitation, restriction, or obligation of secrecy to the inventor.

And I want to stop here because Mr. Dovel put up some words on the side that is supposedly what Mr. Fisher was saying. He said it was only used in testing. It was only in research and development. It was only experimental. It was only internal development.

And when you read through the record and what Mr. Fisher said, that is not what he said about the second generation 1996 system that he actually brought to the courtroom to put in front of the jury.

So I took down what Mr. Dovel said, and I looked back at these references that he was referring the Court to because I noticed they would be in quotes, quote, research and development as those these were words used by Dr.

25 Neikirk -- by Mr. Fisher, but in what context?

So we look at -- and I am on the transcript from

November 10, 2017 in the morning, and I am on Page 123. And

the question was -- it is on background with respect to

Mr. Fisher: In general what were your roles and

responsibilities while you were employed at 3Com?

And he says: I was responsible for developing the

wireless networking technology. I managed the engineering

group. I was the guy that worried about the system problems,

you know, was the -- kind of the key architect on a lot of

things and managed the engineers' day-to-day activity.

And then the question was, by Ms. Cho: Did you

And then the question was, by Ms. Cho: Did you ever do any research or development in the Power over Ethernet field? That is where the quote research and development comes from that they are saying is the limitation that this 1996, Exhibit No. 500 was limited to at 3Com.

Did you ever do any research and development?

And he says: Yes, we did. I, myself, and Larry were kind of the key inventors of it.

That does not mean nor does it say it was only used for research and development.

So I looked next at the next reference he had, which was Page 131 of the same day, November 10th, 2017, in the morning.

And the question is: So the system you have just shown us, is it okay if I call this the Fisher System? And

this was Mr. Thane asking questions about this.

And he says: Yeah, sure, you can call it the Fisher System. It was the first Power over Ethernet. And I was thinking if I were really bold, I would get out the charger and the Ethernet and fire it up, which we could probably do.

And he is talking during the deposition like we could probably do it right here.

And then he goes on to say in the next -- second to next paragraph: So in order to test it, you know, we would just plug that in, stick it in the front of the hub, and then take the 10BaseT wiring that was in the building and plug it in here so --

And the question is: Did you actually implement...

And then it went on to the next questions.

But he is talking about we could test it right here in this room in this deposition. He never says we only used it for testing. The snippets and quotes Mr. Dovel is using are taken completely out of context.

And then, finally, there is another one where he is talking about where he actually -- let me get the phrase on this last one. I'm sorry, Your Honor. Internal development and what they had done. And so the question -- and proposals.

And then so the question is on Page 137, now

Line 8: Sometimes when we have been talking about the system

you have talked about proposals versus the system. Are there

two different things, or was the whole thing a proposal or

something else?

Mr. Fisher says: So we -- so we had built. So it is a good question. The first hardware that we built that I brought with me we had not yet put it in a switch. Then he goes on to talk about the first hardware.

"proposal" there was hardware that was in development that, you know, we were working on it with respect to the first proposal. But the second proposal, what he has then, was what was in use at 3Com that was being used with everyone out in their system that they had plugged in in the ceiling at 3Com to get wireless access information to be used with everyone including the public. That was the second system. That's the 1996 one.

So Mr. Dovel's comment that he says, oh, yes, it couldn't have been that first one from 1995 because then they would be in violation of the on sale bar because their patent application wasn't until 1997. Yes. Well, the one we talked about that was introduced in front of the jury was the 1996. It is copyright 1996. There no question here, they are not in violation of the on sale bar.

But what else does he say? He says -- what Mr. Fisher says on Page 138 of his deposition testimony when he was questioned by Ms. Cho, she asked him a question: But was this concealed?

And he says: I don't know anything about it being concealed from the public.

So there is -- the only testimony with respect to concealment was Ms. Cho's question Network-1 was trying to get him to admit that somehow it was secret, confidential, concealed from the public, and he specifically denies it. I don't know anything about that. He never said it was confidential. He never said there was an NDA. He never said anything about that.

There is just absolutely no testimony on that, which is the testimony that was found in the Dey case, the case that Mr. Dovel says is so similar to this case, Dey specifically -- the inventor said it was unavailable to the public and it was confidential. That is not at all what Mr. Fisher said. That is not what he said in the testimony from this jury. It is not what he said on the phone call with Mr. Neikirk -- Dr. Neikirk that he testified about, and it is just not anywhere shown in the record.

It was used at 3Com with others, a wireless access device with respect to communications.

So the JumpSport case has not been overruled by the

Dey case. The Dey case specifically said it had to be confidential and used with the public. That is not what JumpSport stands for.

The Plaintiff wants us to think it is a public demonstration; that somehow we had to go out and demonstrate it to the public. We are not saying that we had a some kind of -- we presented it at the IEEE. He didn't know anything about that. He was asked about that. He just didn't have any testimony about that. He is not saying that someone else had to see it.

But if there is a public demonstration, as this Court knows, as this Court has tried other invalidity cases, there is no requirement that you have to have someone there that has seen it.

Now, the evidence is stronger for the defense if someone has seen it. So, of course, we are always trying to look for the strongest evidence possible, but there is no evidence of that.

And, in fact, the law is more akin to the Voter case that we cite in our surreply brief, Voter Verified vs.

Premier Election Solutions. As this Court knows, to make it publicly available, for example, all you have to do is put it on the Internet. And in Voter Verified the issue was, well, it may be on the Internet, but a search engine can't find it.

And the Federal Circuit said: Where the Court

found a prior art reference was sufficiently accessible to the public when it was posted online, regardless of whether it could be found using a search engine. The standard for public use is nowhere near as high as what Mr. Dovel is saying.

Now, if we were in front -- if we were arguing that we had lost this issue and we had presented -- we might not be able to have all of the evidence we could have but we had sufficient evidence to make it clear and convincing for this jury with respect to the public use, and that is all that is required under the case law lest because they did not have a specific verdict form on this.

If they had and had listed, okay, was it corroborated? Okay. Was it used in the public? Okay. Were these specific questions asked? That would be different. The Plaintiff wanted a general verdict form, and that was fine with us. So we went with that.

I think I have addressed everything he asked -- he said on public use, but if there are any questions the Court has, I am happy to cover this as well.

All right. Let's go to the next slide, please.

Oh, public use also came in from Dr. Davis because Dr. Davis talked about 3Com and HP had functional systems for delivering Power over Ethernet to wireless access points, and he was talking about the state of the art, but he was clearly

talking about what was happening back then with respect to 3Com.

And the next slide.

So Dr. Davis says, the question is: Now, you told us something about the background of the technology of the patent and various systems and you talked about the Fisher System?

And he says: I did.

And the question is: In your report -- in your report you mentioned from Page 43 to 44 -- and this questioning from Mr. Dovel -- you say, I discussed with Mr. Fisher the work that led to the 3Com Power over Ethernet patents on September 19th, 2016. And during the call Mr. Fisher System explained, and so on; is that correct?

Then he says: What you have up there is correct.

And then Mr. Dovel has specifically put in front of the jury Pages 43 and 44 of Dr. Davis's report. Here are Pages 43 and 44 of Dr. Davis's report.

And these actually say: For example, 3Com -- now

HP -- had functional systems for delivering Power over

Ethernet to wireless access points and VoIP phones that were
effective and safe to operate.

He also says in report that was in front of the jury: It is my opinion that 3Com/HP created the foundation for Power over Ethernet systems including before and after

the development of the 802.3af standard.

Mr. Dovel put those pages in front of the jury.

Next slide, please.

And, of course, there were two things. I think that the argument that Mr. Jacobson actually made with respect to the 50(a) motions, Your Honor, is very limited. It is not broad like Mr. Dovel is saying.

But at the end when he specifically argued with respect to public use and corroboration then and Ms. Bennett responded, you responded: Thank you, Mr. Jacobson. I think there is a legally sufficient evidentiary basis on all of these issues for a jury to find in the Defendant's favor.

That was your ruling on 50(a). It is still your -should be -- we -- request -- it still be your ruling today.

There is still evidence in the record to support both public
use and corroboration under the Federal Circuit law.

Now, next we talk about HP not being estopped. So this is actually another issue that was preserved by 50(a). There is a lot of them that were not preserved by 50(a), but this one was preserved by 50(a).

But it is interesting because Mr. Dovel, who is up here in front of you telling you this issue was going up anyway, but the Federal Circuit law supported his position, the Shaw and the HP cases, the two current 2016 Federal Circuit cases in the area of estoppel actually support

Hewlett-Packard in this case.

Next slide, please.

The issue here is Section 315(e) where they create arguments for estoppel. They are on any ground that the petitioner raised or reasonably could have raised during the inter partes review.

So, of course, the Plaintiff's argument is it looks like they should win on corroboration and public use, and therefore, we can't proceed on the patents. That is not the law in the Federal Circuit.

Fisher, Chang, and Woodmas patents, actually not all of them that are in this case but a subset of them, were put before -- a request with an inter partes review with the PTO which was not instituted. Under Shaw and under the HP cases the current case law in the Federal Circuit is non-instituted references from an IPR are not barred.

And there is no Federal Circuit case law that says what Mr. Dovel is advocating here that because HP joined an already instituted IPR of Avaya -- if the IPR is already instituted, we cannot introduce new prior art into that IPR. Because we joined Avaya's IPR, there is no Federal Circuit law that says that we are somehow barred by bringing a Fisher, Chang, Woodmas patents only before this jury.

We didn't. We think the Fisher System is overwhelmingly with respect to the four elements that we are

talking about with the Fisher System. We think that there is overwhelming evidence that it was corroborated and it was in public use, so we don't really have to reach this issue.

But if the Court does reach this issue, the Federal Circuit law favors HP. That is what the HP case stands for and also Shaw. It is also telling that Mr. Dovel did not address this. It is in both our response brief and our surreply brief, and he did not touch on it at all when he started talking about estoppel.

Next slide.

With respect to waiving all of the other arguments, as this Court knows if a party fails to move for judgment as a matter of law under 50(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure on an issue at the conclusion of the evidence, that party waives both its right to file a renewed post-verdict 50(b) motion and also its right to challenge the sufficiency of the evidence on that right to appeal.

So their arguments with respect to low level current, secondary considerations, secondary power source and main power source, those are all waived.

In particular, in the transcript from 11-10-17, Mr. Jacobson makes his argument with respect to JMOL on 50(a) at the very bottom of Page 157. And it goes two-thirds through the Page 181. He does preserve public use. He does preserve corroboration. He does preserve what he calls his

estoppel argument that we have already addressed.

And then he goes in to talk about the issue with respect to the claim construction, the combination doesn't render the patent obvious, and then there is also this issue with respect to the breach of contract case that we raised that -- where the matter of law should have been in New York, et cetera, and then that was withdrawn.

Those are the only thing he raises. He doesn't say anything specifically about main power source, secondary power source, secondary considerations, et cetera.

And why is this important? It is important because not only does the Federal Circuit case that we just read support saying that you have to raise it on 50(a) to raise it on 50(b), but also the Decorte case versus Jordan says: We caution that the 50(a) motion should be far more specific than a bare bones recitation of insufficient evidence as required by 50(a)(2).

And as this Court knows the i4i/Microsoft case came out of this jurisdiction. And they specifically raised this issue when it said, this may be an interesting issue for appeal, but it is not preserved on 50(a). It was not specifically mentioned, and Microsoft could not raise that point on 50(b).

So it is not just the Federal Circuit that has spoken so strongly on this but the United States Supreme

Court has, as well. They had every opportunity, as this

Court invited, if they wanted to file something that night to

delineate every -- or they wanted to move on, they failed to

do that. These additional points are waived. But there is

sufficient evidence on all of these additional points, so we

are happy to address those as well.

With respect to secondary considerations, and we want to start there because the secondary considerations point is a fairly a large point here.

Oh, before I go to secondary considerations, another point that Mr. Dovel raised in his argument on waiver he talked about the Blackboard case and the Orion case, which are other earlier Federal Circuit cases, but there has been additional Federal Circuit cases that we are talking about here, as well as the Supreme Court case.

But then he started reading from the Knox rebuttal report how we should have been on notice of certain things. That is not proper. Just having it, putting something in a rebuttal report of an expert does not give us notice at the end of trial that they are going to stand up and say, hey, there is no evidence of secondary considerations or somehow that has been left out when clearly that was discussed.

But, I mean, that was something that you cannot do is preserve it by putting it in some type of expert report.

They also cite to Neikirk's expert report as well.

If they think there is missing evidence about something, we failed to address it specifically to their liking with the wording specifically like they like it, that was the time to preserve it, and they failed to do so.

And, Your Honor, what they are asking you to do is basically say that if it is -- it is not waived because we could always put it in our expert reports, then that will really be a problem with 50(a) and 50(b) motions in the future. If all we have to do -- and the Plaintiff and Defendants will do this in the future, if all we have to do in this Court to be able to preserve a 50(a) motion is to include it in some expert report and to have sent it at some point during this trial to the other side and that will suffice for 50(a), that is not the law. That is what they are advocating for this Court to do, and this Court should not hold that to be the law.

All right. So we talked about secondary considerations.

Next slide, please.

As this Court recalls, this is not a case where secondary considerations didn't come into evidence. All of these licenses came into evidence. They came into evidence -- this is a slide from the Plaintiff's opening slide deck. They opened on this because they wanted the jury, our theory is, to advocate during their job.

But the jury heard about these licenses from the get-go, and they analyzed each of these licenses, and they looked at them.

And what did these licenses show?

The next slide.

For example, when we talked about these licenses, we showed the jury through Corey Horowitz, the first witness on the very first day, we said let's look at the Cisco license. There is no admission in the Cisco license that there either constituted an admission of Cisco or its affiliates or Cisco's authorized parties of liability, infringement or validity of the asserted patent. That's what these licenses are. It was just not to have to try the case.

The jury heard of all of -- this is not a case where the jury did not hear this evidence. They heard all of this evidence. Then we also showed where the vast majority of the other licenses have -- there is 12 of them that we went through specifically. We didn't got through all 26 of them. We could have. But they are all very similar. Language saying they did not admit to liability. They just wanted to settle the case. And they also showed that they settled for fairly low amounts.

I mean, there are various amounts that were out there; and depending on -- obviously, money is relative -- but for not anything near the 80 to \$100 million they were

asking from HP in this case. So the jury did hear the evidence of secondary considerations.

They were able to analyze exactly what that evidence was and what it was trying to be used for, and they rejected Plaintiff's thoughts with respect to secondary considerations.

And as the case law in the Federal Circuit says, under Rothman: This Court must presume that the jury adequately weighed this factual evidence and found it insufficient to support a finding of validity. Indeed, a strong prima facie obviousness showing may stand even in the face of considerable evidence of secondary considerations.

We have that here. We heard all of it, they analyzed it, and they still ruled for the Defendant based upon what those licenses really were.

Next slide, please.

And then HP also proved every element that was in the prior art, and we are going through these -- these are the ones we say are waived now. I am happy to go through and we think there was plenty of evidence of all of them.

With respect to low level current, Dr. Neikirk -and you will recall, Your Honor, that this was where
Dr. Neikirk was showing the low level current in Woodmas, and
he specifically went through the Woodmas -- as was -- as the
Court's claim construction, Woodmas would need to be combined

with the other references Chang and Fisher. And I marked specifically where he covered this in his transcript.

Okay. I will have to come -- it is on -- and it is the afternoon of 11-10-17. And he specifically talks about Woodmas and the low level current, and on Pages 32 all the way through 36 talking about the various combination where the low level current is shown under the Court's claim construction.

But more importantly, standing on its own with respect to low level current, he did apply Dr. Knox's interpretation of this Court's claim construction. He did. Because as this Court will recall, in the Realtime Data case this Court is on, if an infringement expert is going to use one interpretation, it is totally fair game for the invalidity expert to use that exact same interpretation. Otherwise, they are holding us to a standard that they themselves don't even meet.

But let's talk about low level current and what he said. The question was: Is there any doubt in the your mind that with respect to the Court's claim construction of low level current and the combination we put before this jury, that the combination does indeed show a low level current?

And Dr. Neikirk says: No, there is absolutely no

And Dr. Neikirk says: No, there is absolutely no doubt in my mind whatsoever.

What else does Dr. Neikirk says? He says: By

delivering this 50 milliamp current before full operating power is supplied and in looking for return voltage representative of the full low level current, both the presence and functionality of power delivery unit 76 are checked before full power is imposed on the cable 30 [Referring to Figure 1 in Woodmas]. Do you see that?

He says: I do.

And here we talk about the low level current, low level power that is met here with respect to Woodmas. We are showing it here in No. 6. That is the slide he had in front of him when he was talking the testimony that was in the record --

Go back to 39, if you don't mind, Josh.

-- when he is giving this testimony with respect to this Q and A how and how it would work with respect to the Woodmas low level current.

And then 40, please.

And he testified specifically that low level current and sensing were both met by Woodmas.

So what else does Dr. Neikirk says? The question was: And that would be applying Judge Schroeder's claim construction of beginning to start the access device but insufficient to sustain start up, as Dr. Knox, the Plaintiff's expert is applying it, right?

He says: Yes, that's correct.

Using his analysis and the way he's applying it, these patents are invalid.

And he says: Yes, they are.

Next slide.

And Dr. Neikirk goes on to say he applies the Court's construction -- is clearly teaching us a great deal about low level currents.

The question was: Sir, in your opinion, does Woodmas disclose or teach a low level current using the Court's definition?

And he says: Applying the Court's definition as the Plaintiff has, then, yes, it is present. And the law in this jurisdiction is that -- under Realtime Data, is that that is the way to interpret this.

Go to the next slide, please.

Oh, I'm sorry. He also says: I'll go ahead and check off low level current again, and pointing out that we will see that it's truly the low level current as construed by the Court when we look at the combination.

And those are the pages of the record that I just referred Your Honor, when we are talking about the combination that he went through showing, using this Court's claim construction how low level current is met by Woodmas when it is used with respect to the Fisher and Chang patents as well.

And this Court in Realtime data had that: Such an approach allows a defendant to set forth relevant, alternative invalidity arguments for the jury to consider in the event that it ultimately finds for -- the Plaintiff's interpretation of the claims is correct.

So not only did he use this Court's claim construction when he was doing the entire combination, but he also used the Plaintiff's interpretation, as well, to show that that indeed was -- you are looking at Woodmas by itself. It did show a low level current.

And this Court in addressing the Koito and

Fresenius case must present some evidence to show that -- a

jury that the prior art reference discloses an element of the

asserted claim. The "some evidence" here is Woodmas.

It is important, Your Honor, because even Dr. Knox acknowledges through sworn testimony that Woodmas shows a low level current. I mean, there is no doubt that Woodmas shows a low level current. And when I look at what he said specifically, Dr. Knox testified under the questioning of Mark Ferguson that it is: Current merely used in detection process.

That was Dr. Knox's interpretation of your claim construction. That's what Dr. Neikirk also used in his interpretation in saying, look, if that is what Dr. Knox is going to use to show infringement, then I will go through

that analysis as well and show it with respect to invalidity.

The jury heard all of this. The jury heard what Mr. Dovel -- the questioning he gave to Dr. Neikirk on cross-examination because he took him through different hypotheticals and what about this? Well, what if you use this definition?

And remember that Dr. -- Mr. Dovel said something like, well, you don't agree with Dr. Knox so, therefore, Dr. Knox is erroneous, so we are using the erroneous claim construction, and you find low level current. And then trying to say, but the correct construction you don't find low level current. And the jury heard all of that.

And the jury still saw through all of that and said -- and we were talking in front of the jury and said, it is the goose/gander rule. If you are going to use -- Dr. Knox is going to have one interpretation of Dr. -- of Judge Schroeder's claim construction, then we are entitled to use that on invalidity as well because that is the law in the circuit and that is the law -- in the Federal Circuit -- in this division, and that is the law in the Federal Circuit as well with respect to Realtime Data.

He heard everything with respect to cross-examination and still the jury found for the Defendant because they saw what Mr. Dovel was trying to pigeon-hole him to say, and they disagreed with what he is saying. The jury

heard that he found low level current in combination, and he also found it in Woodmas alone when he was using Dr. Knox's interpretation of this Court's claim construction.

And then at the end of Mr. Dovel's argument, he puts up my closing argument as evidence somehow of no low level current. But that's obviously, as the Court knows — and the arguments of Counsel are not evidence. It is interesting that Mr. Dovel would put up my argument that it would be evidence of no low level current.

But as you know, we did cover this in front of the jury about all aspects of Dr. Neikirk's testimony because I wanted the jury to see everything just like we want this Court to see everything, and just like we want -- there is evidence to support the invalidity verdict here.

Now, if we could go to the next slide.

With respect to secondary power source, let's look at that. Dr. Neikirk -- the Chang patents, which is where the secondary power source came in with respect to the combination, teaches the data node and the network interface adaptor, the access device, and how they provide electrical power from the hub, the data node, to the remote adaptor, to the access device using the network's wiring.

Mr. Dovel was critical that we did not specifically talk about -- and here is the actual demographic -- demonstrative that was in front of the jury while Mr. --

Dr. Neikirk was giving his testimony that we just went over specifically talking about secondary power source.

But it is interesting because he said, well, you didn't go into the definition of driving points, et cetera. We have, with respect to the secondary power source and the main power source, we have different driving points with this Court's claim construction. And not that you had to have two different driving points from the secondary power source. And in this combination for obviousness, the power sources come from two different patents, so clearly they have two different driving points.

That was an issue that could easily have been cross-examined on. It is an issue that is very obvious since it is not one power source having two different driving points. It is one patent, the Chang patent providing a power source with a driving point, and then the Woodmas patent providing a power source with the driving point, so they are clearly two different things. That is a red herring.

But the Chang patent does teach the secondary power source, and this demonstrative was also in front of the jury where he went through and showed Fisher plus Chang teach everything except for low level current, and that needed to be added by Woodmas.

I believe I have covered everything on secondary power source. Now let's go to the next one. Main power

source.

The issue here is not whether main power source or not I believe -- because clearly Fisher teaches main power source, and that was definitely covered with respect to the evidence in the case.

I believe the issue here is, again, that we did not show that main power source was delivering a low level current and also sending power to the data node, the access -- the data node. I believe that is the issue that we have here. And that was taught here with respect to the combination.

So we have the Fisher, Chang, and Woodmas combination, and then we have the Chang -- in the lower left-hand corner here and on Slide 51, the lower left-hand corner shows the Chang actual power source, and then we have on the 51, the right-hand corner we have the Woodmas power source, the power receptor unit.

And so those in combination -Go to the next slide.

Those in combination show one power source actually covering, delivering the low level current and sending power to the -- connected to the supply power to the data node and delivering the low level current.

And, as you will recall, we talked for pages about motivation to combine and whether there was evidence of

motivation to combine. That is replete throughout

Dr. Neikirk's testimony. Then we specifically covered, is
this what experts in the field do is to look at these
different patents and combine them? And he said, yes, this
is exactly what they would do.

And there was no cross-examination on that point whatsoever, so to say that he did not combine them now or did not have evidence of a main power source doing A and B, that is just not credible since the testimony is that he did.

When the jury was supplied with sufficient, valid factual information to support the verdict it reaches, that is the end of the matter. In such an instance the jury's factual conclusion may not be set aside by a JMOL order. Here the facts are not only that they had corroborating public use -- arguments with respect to the Fisher System. And the Fisher System is prior art. I don't think they are arguing that it is too late. I mean, it is 1996 we are talking about. It is more than two or three years before the patents applied for here. There is no evidence -- there is no issue here.

But we are talking about, even after they have waived these other elements and they have waived secondary considerations, we still went through and showed you in the record where everything was. And it is definitely in our attachments and in the briefing as well.

Go to the next slide.

And we will just end, again, with this is a general invalidity verdict. It is difficult to say at this point that something was not specifically met or it was met. I mean, the evidence shows that everything was met.

And the jury answered in a general verdict form for each of these. And as this Court knows invalidity is extremely and difficult to get and especially in East Texas.

This verdict should be affirmed unless the evidence points so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of Network-1 that reasonable persons could not reach a conclusion -- a conclude -- a different conclusion. That is just not what is happening here. The evidence is replete in the brief, and we ask this Court to affirm the verdict.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. DOVEL: I am going to do a very, very short reply. Regarding public, use you saw no testimony presented on this screen regarding public use. You heard two assertions from Ms. Doan of public use.

The first was that Dean Neikirk testified that he had a phone call with Fisher where Fisher told him it was in public use. Those are Ms. Doan's words. There was no such testimony. That is why she didn't show it to you.

I invite Ms. Doan if she has the testimony any time before the day is out to put it up here on the screen so the

Court can do it. There was no testimony from Dean Neikirk that Fisher told him it was in public use.

The second thing she said was, there was this second Fisher System, and that was the one that was used with everyone else and the public. There was no such testimony.

Again, Your Honor, no such testimony. She presented you no testimony regarding public use because there was none.

Regarding low level current, Your Honor, you saw no testimony from anyone that Woodmas or any system in the prior art would begin start up of an access device. The reason is they presented no such testimony.

Moreover, we presented testimony from their expert and our expert that the prior art would not begin start up of an access device, would not meet the Court's instruction. HP simply ignores that. They have got no response for them.

Regarding secondary power source, again, they presented you no testimony that any prior art reference disclosed a secondary power source, no testimony from an expert applying the Court's constructions.

And, finally, regarding main power source, they presented you no evidence at all. The only thing you were shown were demonstratives, which were not in evidence. They didn't point to a single scrap of testimony, not a line, not a clause, not a single exhibit. There is no evidence of a main power source.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. DOAN: Okay. So to say that we don't have any testimony with respect to public use is obviously not accurate because we put it up here in front of the Court. It is on our Slide 19.

The question and answer from -- it is always -- I'm so sorry -- it is submitted as Exhibit 6, Page 22, Lines 7 through 20.

Dr. Neikirk, was Mr. Fisher's system, was that in public use?

Yes, I believe it was.

The phone call that he had was specifically described on Pages 10 and 11 of his testimony.

I mean, I think that was the issue with respect to whether he had a phone call with him or not, and how else could he get this information other than through this phone call and listening to what he said there that day?

On Page 10 it is on -- Page 10 the question is -we are talking about the duplicate paragraphs on Line 21. On
Line 23, in that same section on the state of the art was the
description of what Dr. Fisher told me when I had a
conference call with him. And that is referring to his
expert report where he talks about the phone call with
Mr. Fisher.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

And I asked: And, indeed -- at the top of Page 11 -- and did you do a conference call with Mr. Fisher? And Yes, he did. So we have definitely done that. he says: With respect to -- I can't remember what his challenge was on the second one, but the -- there is an earlier system that Mr. Fisher definitely talked about that was a '95 system. And the second generation system was 1996. And in 1996 the one that was copywritten at 3Com was used openly at 3Com. They specifically tried to induce evidence of some type of concealment. He denied that. is nothing he knows about with respect to concealment because it was used openly. And there is -- all of the cases that they rely upon deal with concealment, secretive, not use publicly, these are all admissions. There is no admission like that here. Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you. MS. CHO: Your Honor, in addition to granting Network-1's motion as a matter of law on invalidity, the Court should also conditionally grant a new trial on invalid -- on validity on three grounds. First, it is against the great weight of the evidence. Second, a new trial should be granted because

inadmissible evidence was admitted.

And, third, based on improper closing statements.

I will address the first one. The verdict on validity was against the great weight of the evidence.

Under Fifth Circuit law a district court may grant a new trial if the jury verdict is against the great weight of the evidence.

The following findings which were necessary -- each of which were necessary for the jury verdicts -- I think it is on an automatic slide show.

Just one second, Your Honor.

(Pause in proceedings.)

MS. CHO: Okay. There we go.

Okay. The following findings, which were necessary for the jury's invalidity verdict, were against the great weight of the evidence.

First, that Fisher was prior art. As we previously explained, for Fisher to be prior art there must be evidence of public use.

Second, the low level current. There was no evidence, as we explained, of the low level current, the secondary power source, and the main power source, each of these were against the great weight of the evidence.

In fact, there was no evidence at all that Fisher was publicly used or that the prior art disclosed each of

those elements. That is the low level current, the secondary power source, or the main power source. And in cases where there is an absence of evidence supporting the jury's verdict, the Court must grant a motion for new trial.

Here I have got Fifth Circuit law on the board.

Irvan vs. Frozen Food Express. The trial Court will be deemed to have abused its discretion in denying a new trial when there is an absolute absence of evidence to support the jury's verdict.

Then there is a Federal Circuit case applying that,
Wordtech Systems. A new trial is also required because
Wordtech fails to identify proof of elements required. There
the elements were contributory infringement. Here they are
the elements of invalidity.

We had four independent grounds on which there was no evidence. And because there was an absolute absence of evidence on those, a new trial must be granted.

I also want to mention that HP has a -- had a waiver argument that they raised on the judgment as a matter of law. That does not apply to motions for new trial. A motion for new trial as against the great weight of the evidence is available regardless of whether a party moves or does not move for motion as a matter of law.

Next the motion for new trial should also be conditionally granted because inadmissible evidence was

admitted.

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

Where inadmissible is considered that was prejudicial, a new trial should be granted. In Carson vs. Polley, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court, of course, has power to grant a new trial when the jury has inadvertently considered inadmissible evidence and the evidence was prejudicial to the losing party.

That is what we have here. As previously explained, corroboration was required to show that the Fisher System was prior art and was publicly use.

10

And Network-1 objected to the admissibility of the Fisher System on the basis that it was not corroborated. However, Mr. Fisher was allowed to testify at length about his system.

Mr. Fisher testified that he had a detection system, a detection system that was done just by virtue of the current limit and voltage. He further went on to testify that his detection system involved a staged powering up, a current limit, and an authentication process that followed.

None of these things were corroborated at all. There was no corroboration of the fact that Mr. Fisher had a detection system that used a limited current, staged powering up, or authentication.

What does HP say in response? They don't identify any testimony where any of this is corroborated or point to

anything corroborating any of these things for the Fisher System. Instead, what HP says in its papers is that it relied on other art for these elements. He said this doesn't matter because we showed this existed in other art.

This just shows how confusing and prejudicial this would have been to the jury. If HP had intended to rely on other art to show these elements, then why did they play this testimony? The testimony about the Fisher System having all of these elements, that was confusing and prejudicial. That was the only reason to play that testimony.

HP also argues, well, we don't have to the corroborate every single detail of the Fisher System. They say, you don't have to corroborate every single thing.

Network-1 doesn't contend that every detail of the Fisher System needs to be corroborated, but the important things, the important things that they intend to rely on, those things need to be corroborated. And we know that these were the important details of the Fisher System because that is exactly what HP argued in closing.

In closing when they talked about the Fisher

System, they described the staged power ups, detection and authentication, and the low current. These were the important things that they wanted the jury to get out of the Fisher System, and absolutely none of it was corroborated.

Because of that it was very prejudicial and very confusing to

the jury. And it should have been excluded.

Finally, the motion for a new trial should also be conditionally granted because of improper closing statements made by HP.

Now, what does HP say about this argument? HP says it is waived. In their briefing they say Plaintiff failed to object during its now complained of portions of HP's closing statement. Therefore, it is barred from claiming it is entitled to a new trial.

This argument fails. The reason is because under Fifth Circuit law improper argument is a basis for a new trial where substantial justice is at stake. In Alaniz vs. Zamora-Quezada, the Fifth Circuit held: Improper argument may be the basis for a new trial where no objection has been raised only where the interest of substantial justice is at stake.

And in In re Isbell the Fifth Circuit goes on to describe when substantial justice is at stake. A closing statement may implicate the interest of substantial justice when counsel's assertions are either false or without basis in the record.

And that is exactly what happened here. We have closing statements that were made that were without any basis in the record.

First, HP suggested in its closing argument that

the low level current limitation is found in Cummings. There was absolutely no basis for that in the record.

This is from the closing. It says: So there's so much evidence of this low current going to detection circuitry. Who else do we have?

And then they point to: With respect to the Cummings patent, and you'll have the Cummings patent before you. It's DX146. This is another patent that's claiming to have PoE detection as well. It's from April 1995, way before the '930 patent. It's detecting -- it's detecting the connection of such equipment low current power is provided to each of the current loops. You'll have this. It's DX146.

Now, Cummings was not part of HP's invalidity contentions. It was not part of their obviousness case. It wasn't part of the obviousness combination at all. They didn't rely on it as disclosing a low level current. Yet these comments were made to show that this low level current was actually in Cummings.

And this was particularly prejudicial because the low level current limitation was the limitation that HP's expert Dr. Neikirk had conceded wasn't found in the prior art.

So these statements invite the jury to look at Cummings and find the low level current in the prior art themselves even though it is not part of their obviousness

contentions. It is very prejudicial.

In addition to that, there were statements made by HP that were attributed to Mr. Godici that also had absolutely no basis in the record.

I'll put up the excerpt from the transcript. Look at all of the prior art. You know, when Nick Godici, when we were talking about coming and him testifying, he could not believe how much prior art and how much evidence this case had with respect to this patent being invalid.

Here is where in the record there is support for that. Absolutely nowhere. There is no support anywhere in the other trial transcript that suggests that Mr. Godici ever made these comments about the amount of prior art that there was with respect to this patent being invalid.

Mr. Godici never testified about this at trial at all. And here the statement was particularly prejudicial because the jury had already been told that Mr. Godici is the former chairman of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. Thus, the jury is being led to believe that the former chairman of the Patent and Trademark Office believes there is lots of evidence with respect to this patent being invalid.

That was highly prejudicial and completely without basis in the record. Because of that, that the motion for new trial should also be conditionally granted.

Unless Your Honor has any questions.

THE COURT: I do not. I do not. Thank you.

MS. CHO: Thank you.

MS. DOAN: Your Honor, the motion for new trial should also be denied on invalidity. And let me just touch briefly. I'm not going to cover all of the parts on corroboration and the other issues that we have already argued earlier this afternoon with respect to the great weight of the evidence. But I do want to show what the evidence was and the standard is with respect to the Fifth Circuit and this Court.

This Court says: But the burden a movant must meet is high. A motion for new trial should not be granted unless the verdict is against the great weight of the evidence, not merely against the preponderance of the evidence. This Court is not to reweigh the evidence.

I know that Network-1 disagrees with the weight of the evidence, and they perhaps don't believe that it is clear and convincing. But the jury thought that it was. And the jury is the one that decides. And the burden to set aside that verdict and have a new trial on that issue that we have tried for six days with all of experts and witnesses that came in from everywhere, is a burden they have not yet met.

And here is why. First of all, it is against the great weight of the evidence. Listen to what the evidence

was. We have Dean Neikirk and all of his testimony. We have the prior art patents. We have three with respect to Fisher, and then we have a European patent from Fisher. We have two with respect to -- we have a Chang patent and a European patent and then we have the Woodmas patent.

We have this Court's claim construction. We have Fisher System itself. We have pictures of the Fisher System that have been labeled by Mr. Fisher. And we have Mr. Fisher's testimony.

And let's not forget we also have Mr. Horowitz's testimony, the CEO of Network-1 where he also knows that this patent may be obvious, and there were other detection systems out there more than 15 years ago. So the great weight of the evidence is, indeed, that the patent is invalid.

I'm sorry.

When Ms. Cho was talking about corroboration, again, she is quoting to Finnigan. And I think we have addressed Finnigan; but as this Court knows, Finnigan was the case where there was -- it is anticipation, not combination for obviousness. And it is also just the testimony of the inventor without any type of product, drawings, or patents. Here we have all three, so it is definitely very different.

With respect to Mr. Fisher's specific testimony, staged power up, limited current, and authentication, these were not -- and we specifically told the jury these were not

the four points that we were making with respect to the Fisher System.

The Fisher System was made with respect to data node, access device, data signaling pair, and main power source. That was shown through the Fisher System, not the other three. But we went ahead and played -- they did not object to those specific questions coming in.

Then later on we did go back and talk about the state of the art when this invention was coming out and not just with the Fisher System and the limited current, because as this Court will recall, Mr. Fisher knew about the specific type of low level current.

He didn't call it a low level current. He called it a current that was sufficient to begin start up but insufficient to sustain start up, and he knew about that type of current, but he decided not to go with that and went with a different type of current.

So, if anything, they could argue that it is teaching away, but that is not what we pointed out from low level current was not Fisher's testimony anyway. So their objections at this late date are of no event and actually should definitely not only be sustained but point to the other way.

With respect to the improper closing arguments, let's delve straight into that because I do think it is a

personal attack.

You specifically instructed the jury what you should base your decision on is the evidence that you will hear from the witness stand and by deposition and the exhibits that I admit into evidence. You will rely on this evidence in making your decision as to the verdict in this case.

Then you went on to say: After I instruct you on the law, the attorneys will have an opportunity to make their closing arguments. Statements and arguments of the attorneys are not evidence and are not instructions on the law. They are intended only to assist you in understanding the evidence and the parties' contentions.

The Fifth Circuit law is: The plaintiff's failure to object to the impropriety of the defendant's closing argument, bars it from urging the improper arguments as grounds for new trial after the jury returns its verdict.

This is not a case where Mr. Dovel does not know how to object during closing argument. In fact, he did object during closing argument, as this Court will recall.

And asked a sidebar. And asked us to redo something. And that was on the oscillating power source that was already in evidence on the preferred embodiment, and he asked us to rephrase that, and we thought that all worked out. That was on Page 110 of the record during my -- during HP's closing

argument.

So he knows how to object, but didn't object to either the Cummings issue or to the Godici issue that they are raising now. So they are completely waived at this point.

And before I go any further, go back one more slide. No, no, I'm sorry. Go back one. Yes.

When you are talking about closing arguments to the jury, and you are telling them specifically that it is just attorney argument, it is Mr. Dovel that in the last motion, he puts up our closing argument of evidence of lack of low level current.

You cannot have it both ways. You cannot say that closing argument is evidence and then closing argument is not evidence. It is not evidence to sustain anything they have with respect to low level current, and it's definitely not evidence with respect to anything we say with respect to Cummings and Godici.

But let's look specifically at what actually came into evidence with respect to Cummings and Godici because that is where the heart of the matter is.

Dr. Davis did -- the Cummings patent, DX146, is in evidence. It was in evidence before closing. And anything that is in evidence can be used for any purpose. Dr. Davis said -- and the question: Did the '930 patent inventor

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

invent the idea of doing detection of remote equipment over Ethernet lines? He says: No, they didn't. Is there something you're aware of, some prior work that you're aware of that touched on that? And he said: Yes, sir. I show on the next slide a patent issued to Cummings. And the question is: Can you tell us what you are looking at here and explain what you mean by that? Yes, sir. The left side is the front page --And if you will switch now, Josh to go over --This is the Cummings patent that actually came in, This is what actually came in and was used at DX146. closing. It is the same thing that was used with Dr. Davis during his testimony. And if you'll look on the abstract, the part that is highlighted, detecting the disconnection of such equipment from the network, a low current power signal is provided to each of the current loops. That is the quote that they are complaining of that we made during closing argument. And 10BaseT communication link. And it is patent dated April 11th, 1995. All of this came in through Dr. Davis. So go back to Dr. Davis's testimony. He specifically goes on to say: Yes, sir, the front page on the left, on the right some things have been

blown up. The inventor's name is Mr. Cummings. The patent was actually issued in April 1995. And then out of the abstract they describe what it is this patent does.

And in three highlighted sections we see that they are wanting to do detection of the disconnection of equipment from the network. And the second highlighted section the way they are going to do what is with a low level -- the low current power signal that's provided to something they call a current loop. And they then -- down at the bottom, it says: This the invention is particularly adapted to be used with an existing 10BaseT communication link. 10BaseT is slang for an Ethernet network.

So we look at what was said actually during closing argument, and I am on Page 131 of HP's closing argument, and I am on Line 20.

With respect to the Cummings patent -- and you will have the Cummings patent before you. It is DX146. This is another patent that is claiming to have PoE detection as well. It is from April 1995, way before the '930 patent. It is detecting -- it is detecting the connection of such equipment. Low current power is provided to each of the current loops. You will have this. It is Exhibit No. 146.

And we went through various other types of detection systems because Mr. Horowitz had already told the jury there are other detection systems that are out there

that may render this obvious. Cummings was just one of them.

Dave Dwelley testified about other detection systems. He talked about the signature resistor method that had been adopted by the IEEE. There was also testimony about different detection systems that came in that were presented to the IEEE. There was also other detection systems that were covered as well throughout the testimony.

This is just one they complain of because they somehow think that I am saying that it is low level current.

I am not saying that. I am saying it is the low current power because that is exactly directly from the abstract -
On the prior page.

-- from the abstract, and it is exactly what
Mr. Davis had in his testimony. There is nothing improper
about that argument. But if there had been something
improper about that argument, Mr. Dovel should have objected
at the time, and he clearly knew how to object because he had
already objected before in this closing argument.

Next slide.

Now, let's look at what they have got -- yes, with respect to what we talked about Mr. Godici and the prior art, and they said that somehow he did not talk about the prior art, and as you know he did not talk about the prior art in mapping the prior art at all to the patent. That was left to Dr. Neikirk.

But he did go through not only the prior art and what was not considered but what was considered by the Patent Office so that that they would know what had been considered already and what had not been considered already.

And then we have the pages -- Slide No. 64.

But after we put on his direct testimony when he covered what prior art was considered and not considered, then it was Mr. Dovel which approached this Court that said, I just want to the put on this IDS, and I want to take him through that prior art as well. So PX253 came into evidence, and he listed all of the prior art, went over the prior art of the different patents that had been out as well. So there was lots of prior art that was discussed by Mr. Godici.

He had not done any type of analysis. And we did not say that he had done any type of analysis. He did discuss lots of prior art, and there is lots of prior art in this particular case. There is nothing improper about that argument, certainly nothing improper to cause a motion for new trial now when they waived the argument by not objecting at the time it came in.

For all of these reasons, Your Honor, we ask that the motion for new trial be denied.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MS. CHO: I just want to make a couple of really brief points in rebuttal.

First on the argument about waiver on the motion for new trial based on arguments that were made on closing.

I have Fifth Circuit law on the board. It is on Slide 16.

There is no waiver if substantial justice is at stake. Then the Court can still grant a motion for new trial based on closing arguments.

And substantial justice is at stake where closing arguments are made that are without a basis in the record or are false. So we would say this applies here. There is no waiver on these closing arguments.

The next point that I want to make is, as Mr. Dovel explained, there was an absence of evidence in HP's case about Fisher on public use and that the prior art disclosed the low level current, secondary power source, and the main power source.

And where there is a complete absence of evidence on a required element, the motion for new trial is required under Fifth Circuit law.

MS. DOAN: Very briefly, Your Honor.

With respect to substantial prejudice, and I have -- don't have the case that Ms. Cho had up, but I am aware of cases that deal with substantial prejudice; i.e., a plaintiff's lawyer making the argument that the defendant has lots of insurance coming in during closing argument and getting a new trial on that.

I am also aware of inappropriate use of the Golden Rule coming in during closing argument. That would be substantial prejudice. But actually talking about prior art that Mr. Godici had mentioned because he did mention prior art in his testimony or talking about the exact same thing that Dr. Davis talked about with respect to the Cummings patent and reading from the abstract of the Cummings patent with low current power is not appropriate argument.

Thank you, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Mr. Dovel, before we proceed to the next motion, let's take a very short break.

(Recess was taken at this time.)

MR. DOVEL: Your Honor, now we turn to the subject

THE COURT: Be seated. Mr. Dovel, you may proceed.

of infringement in the jury verdict of infringement.

For this, Your Honor, we seek a new trial because the verdict was against the great weight of the evidence. It is important that Your Honor when ruling on this would keep in mind that, as the Fifth Circuit has held, a verdict can be against the great weight of the evidence even if there is substantial evidence to support it.

For this motion the Trial Court, Your Honor, does not need to take the view of the evidence favorable to the winner. Instead, Your Honor is going to actually weigh the

evidence. That is what you are going to do in ruling on this new trial motion. This is the Shows case, which is the -- recognized as the leading case in the Fifth Circuit on this subject.

And when you weigh it, Your Honor, you are going to conclude that the great weight of the evidence favored a finding of infringement, not non-infringement.

Now, there are two elements that we are arguing that are the subject of our motion. One is the low level current element. The other is the main power source. I am going to start with low level current.

And the place I am going to start with low level current is this "sufficient to begin start up." HP's arguments all focused on that arguing that their current was not sufficient to begin start up. That is what they were trying to establish.

In understanding that, Your Honor, what we are going to show you is that, in fact, they didn't actually put on any evidence addressing that. They instead addressed something else, whether their current was sufficient to start up.

To understand the importance of that, Your Honor, I am going to go back to the claim construction because this issue was actually ruled on. This was one of the primary issues that was argued in the papers and in oral argument at

claim construction, and the Court issued an express ruling on this.

And the ruling was that begin start up and start up are two different things. Begin start up is when components of an access device start up. And start up is when the whole thing is starting up.

And what we pointed out to the Court during claim construction was that in the patent it talks about an access device, a telephone -- I have a picture of it on the screen. It is very similar to the one that HP showed the jury.

And for it to begin start up, it wasn't the case that this phone itself started up. Instead, it was just a single component down inside the phone. I have got that on the screen now. A DC/DC switching supply would begin to start up.

And based on that -- and here I have got the Court's order, Markman ruling right on the screen. The Court ruled: The current need not be sufficient to result in a completed start up. The current must be sufficient to begin start up rather than cause start up, thus eliminating any implication that the current must be sufficient to result in a completed start up.

The Court ruled that HP's attempt to read that into the claim is wrong. The low level current doesn't need to start up an access device. It only has to begin start up, to

begin with certain components, not start up the entire access device.

The Court expressly ruled: It need not be sufficient to result in a completed start up.

So when Your Honor weighs the evidence, you have got to credit evidence that addresses the Court's actual construction, begin start up. And you have got to give no weight to HP's evidence that addresses whether their current would cause an access device to start up.

Dr. Neikirk, their infringement expert, after the Court issued this claim construction ruling, agreed exactly this point. And here is his testimony: To be a low level current, does the current have to be at a level sufficient to begin start up of all of the components?

No, it doesn't say that.

If you have a detection current that is sufficient to begin start up of a portion of the access device, would you agree that that current is sufficient to begin start up of the access device?

ANSWER: That would meet the requirements for a low level current, so I would agree.

Now if we look at -- put on the screen now -- this is the photo of their access device that HP used at the trial and the demonstration that they provided to the jury.

To determine whether this access device begins

start up, we don't look at whether it starts up. That is, we don't look at the end of the process, whether the lights go on and the screen starts up. That is when we have got a completed start up.

Instead, we look at the beginning of the process.

Begin start up for a device just like with the preferred embodiment in the patent, is going to start down inside the device. You have to look down inside the circuitry, and HP showed us that diagram as well.

We have got to look and see whether the components inside that access device begin to start up.

We submitted evidence of overwhelming weight on that point. And as it turns out -- I am going to show Your Honor -- it was actually undisputed. You will recall that Dr. Knox, he walked through a diagram, a circuit diagram of the components that were affected by the detection current, and he showed the path of the current and showed and highlighted in yellow all of these components.

And then he testified, he was asked: Do these components begin to consume power? Did they begin to start up?

ANSWER: Yes.

Can you explain why?

Well, first off, you can measure the power that they consume.

How do you know it is beginning to start up?

Well, we have got diodes that have gone above a certain threshold. They have transitioned to conducted state. We've got transistors in this integrated circuit that have made decisions. Capacitors that have charged up.

He talked about this yellow rectangle, the integrated circuit, and he said it had more components down inside of it. And he analyzed those. He said: They are active components in there. They take on certain states when there is a low level current. Active components.

As a result, portions of the device are operating -- when portions of the device are operating, the devices begin to start up.

Dr. Knox's testimony on this point was not in any way impeached or rebutted or diminished on cross-examination.

And then, Your Honor, we got similar testimony from HP's witnesses. When HP's witnesses were asked specifically about the components of the access device and whether they would begin to start up, they had to agree that they did.

Here, for example, is David Tremblay. He was their engineer. He is the one who did this demonstration that showed the outside of the phone not starting up.

But he was asked this specific question: Can you tell us whether the components that Mr. Dovel covered on P122, do they or do they not work during detection during the

detection phase?

ANSWER: Yes, ma'am, several of those do work, several of those do work during the detection phase.

So Mr. Tremblay, their own engineer, admitted, yes, these components that we went through, they do work during the detection phase.

Their expert Dr. Davis, he admitted that the level that would be -- if we actually look at the measured amperage that would be sufficient to start up the access device, the level would be 100 microamps.

100 microamps would be sufficient to begin start up.

It is starting the device, yes.

He further testified that: When the current level is at .1 milliamp, the start up of the access device will have already taken place. That is the same as 100 microamps.

So we have testimony from Dr. Davis definitively establishing the level that is required, what current level, what is our level that is required.

And he then further admitted that HP's detection currents were all above that level. They were all above the level required for start up.

And he then further admitted that HP's detection currents were all above that level. They were all above the level required for start up, between 165 and 275 microamps.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

So when we actually look at the actual -- the correct question, which is, what is the level required to begin start up, HP's witnesses agreed with Dr. Knox that they would. Dr. Davis gave additional testimony. Would you agree, sir, that if an access device begins to start up, it has a component that's consuming power? I think that would be fair, yes. ANSWER: Let's go back to the diagram. Do each of those components begin to consume power from the detection current? ANSWER: A little bit, yes. So they are all consuming power. He was asked specifically about some of these components that are part of the integrated circuit that the detection current passes through and whether these components are activated. Do you agree that this yellow triangle thing, this detection comparator is an active component? ANSWER: Yes. Mr. Dwelley, David Dwelley also agreed. This triangle, what is it called? That's a comparator. Is that an active component as well? It is, yes.

He also agreed that the detection current will be sufficient to charge the capacitor. He said the detection current must charge that capacitor.

So when asked about the components, the overwhelming weight of the evidence showed that HP's detection current would be sufficient to begin start up, to start up components of the access device.

Mr. Tremblay's testimony that I put on the screen here, Exhibit 20 -- or Slide 22, they don't have an answer for it. They have no explanation for this. They have no way around it. It is conclusive on the issue. It certainly establishes the great weight of the evidence. The components do work during the detection phase.

Now, HP, what they do -- what they did at trial was rather than engage on that issue, an issue that established that they do infringe, they did two things to submit what I call pernicious testimony, that is, invidious testimony, testimony that doesn't actually prove what they want, that actually is designed to fool the jury.

The first was they presented hours of testimony in which they substituted start up for begin start up. They did exactly what the Court ruled could not be done in claim construction. The Court ruled that to begin start up doesn't require completed start up. You don't have to start up an access device. You don't have to turn it on. You just have

to begin start up.

But HP's entire infringement case on low level current was based on this pernicious substitution.

For example, Mr. Tremblay they had him do a demonstration, and he testified that it doesn't meet the Court's construction. It doesn't begin start up. Why is that? Is it because it doesn't turn on components? No.

Here is what he said: The phone is not on.

There's no lights turning on. There's no display. Can't

make a phone call with it. It's non-operational. The phone
is not usable.

He is supplying the test rejected by the Court. He is applying the test that it must result in start up of the access device.

He continued: The phone has not begun to turn on.

The phone is not sustaining the power. It's not functioning.

You can't make a phone call with it. Those currents would

never allow this IP phone to begin to sustain start up.

So here he is openly stating that his current will not sustain start up. But that is not the test. It just has to begin. In fact, to be a low level current it must not sustain start up. It must not reach operational levels.

Let me go to our Slide 34.

I asked him directly about this. In this admission, again, they have got no response to this.

Yes, sir.

ANSWER:

As you were just using the phrase "begin start up," were you referring to the point when the device gets operational power and begins to do its operational functions?

He said that: When this device gets greater than 30 volts, that enables that device to begin and sustain that start up.

So as he testified, as he was presenting his testimony, he was doing this substitution that the Court in the claim construction had ruled should not be done. He was saying, yes, this current, the reason it doesn't meet the Court's construction, is because it doesn't begin start up. And by begin start up, I mean start up. Operational power. It performs its operational functions.

We can't see that the light is on. We can't see that -- you can't make a phone call with it.

Dr. Davis admitted the same thing. This is Slide 35. He explained to the jury how he was applying low level current.

And he says this: And the way this low level current is going to work is that it is going to start up the access device. He is substituting start up for begin start up. He is requiring that the detection current actually start up of the access device.

He testified over and over. We quoted pages of it

in our brief. Here is a few examples.

He says: The access device has not started up yet. We observed the phone was not doing anything. We don't turn on the access device until we've got at least 30 volts.

The access device has got to receive 30 volts in order to turn on and begin to operate. When we get above 30, we saw the phone turned on, and it would have been operational.

But that is not begin start up, Your Honor. That is the end of the process when it is already started up. So they presented literally hours of testimony from the Tremblay and Davis on the very premise that the Court had rejected in claim construction. Begin start up does not mean start up. That was testimony that should be given no weight.

They didn't present testimony, they did not present testimony from their engineer or from Davis or from anyone else that this detection current was insufficient to begin start up, to start up certain components in the access device. In fact, as we just saw, each of their witnesses admitted that it certainly would start up components in the access device.

The next thing they did, Your Honor, the second thing is this: They said, well, these components that are started up, they are not part of the access device or part of the operational circuitry of the access device.

Here is Mr. Tremblay. He is asked this: When the access device -- during the detection phase does the operational circuitry get used?

No, ma'am, it does not.

QUESTION: Even though it is consuming some current in the access device, that's not going to be the operational circuitry side?

ANSWER: That's absolutely correct.

Davis provided snippets of similar testimony. When they gave that testimony, in fact, it was false and they knew it was false, as we demonstrated at trial.

First of all, the first thing they are suggesting is, well, maybe this stuff that starts up is not actually physically part of the access device. But the evidence showed these components were located in the physical core of the access device.

This is our Slide 39, and you can -- it depicts a photograph -- a depiction that was used by Dr. Davis, and on it he identified the PoE chip. That is that yellow chip from the earlier diagram. And showed where it was located. And Dr. Knox then identified where the transistors were located physically.

And you can see that these components are located in the physical core of the access device. They are not separate from it in anyway.

Next HP suggests that, well, maybe they are not part of the access device when it is actually operating as an access device, but that is simply not true, as we demonstrated at trial.

The Court defined access device. An access device is a device that can receive and transmit data over a network. So the components of an access device that make it an access device are those used when it receives and transmits data over a network.

And the evidence undisputedly -- was undisputed that each of those components that we identified that start up are components that are part of the access device with that definition.

Dr. Knox testified -- was asked this: When the access device is actually operating, are these essential components.

He said: Yes, if you removed, for example, that steering diode or this chip or the transformers, the whole thing would just stop operating. He explained that these transformers are used to separate data. You need transformers even if you're just going to send and receive data.

The transformers were the parts of the access device that actually interconnected with the network, the actual physical components that did the receiving and

transmitting of data. They are the most important thing, the single -- the most important single component of an access device.

Now, what about HP's witnesses, did they disagree with this when they were asked the specific questions about these components? No, they admitted that all of these components are part of the operational circuitry, the access device.

Here is Mr. Tremblay, their engineer: Is the center tap itself used when it's fully operational?

ANSWER: Yes.

This is part of the operational circuitry of the access device, true?

It is part of the -- that particular component is the connection medium, yes.

Part of the operational circuitry, true?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

That is an unambiguous admission. And what that means, Your Honor, is that when he testified earlier in response to HP's questions that they are not part of the operational circuitry, he wasn't telling the truth. He was trying to fool the jury.

When confronted with the actual components, he admitted that, yes, they were part of the operational circuitry.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

His testimony continued: Let's go one at a time. The center tap transformers are used during full operation, right? ANSWER: Yes, sir. The diodes are used during full operation? Yes, sir. The capacitor? Yes, sir. What about Dr. Davis, their expert? He tried on direct examination with HP to say the same thing, they are not part of the access device, they are not part of the operational circuitry. But on cross-examination when actually confronted with the actual components, he had to admit that all of them were part of the operational circuitry. An important part of the operation of this access device is the center tap transformer would be in place, right? ANSWER: Yes. There were certain components that the detection current went through that were used during the operation of the access device when it was fully operational, true? ANSWER: Yes, sir. Those components that are used during the operation, operational circuitry, it includes the center tap

transformers, right? 1 2 ANSWER: Yes. 3 Same question for the diode. Yes. 4 5 Same question for the capacitor. 6 It is used during the operation of the access 7 device? The PoE chip is used during the operation? 8 9 It does functions, yes. 10 So each of those components when HP's witnesses 11 were actually confronted with them and what they actually do 12 in the access device, admitted that they were operational 13 components of the access device, part of the operational 14 circuitry. 15 HP's effort to say that they are not part of the 16 operational circuitry was simply pernicious and designed to 17 fool the jury. But it can't fool this Court when weighing 18 the evidence. Your Honor can't credit their simple 19 conclusion, oh, they are not part of the operational 20 circuitry when they provided on cross-examination detailed 21 admissions, pointedly -- as on point as possible that they 22 were part of the operational circuitry. 23 THE COURT: Mr. Dovel, you are out of time. 24 MR. DOVEL: I will wrap up then, Your Honor. 25 We also in our papers explain why the main power

source evidence would be against the weight of the evidence, 1 2 and we will rely on our papers for that. 3 Thank you, Your Honor. THE COURT: Thank you very much. 4 5 MR. MEHTA: Good afternoon, Your Honor. THE COURT: Good afternoon. 6 7 MR. MEHTA: Network-1's motion for a new infringement trial should be denied. The jury's 8 9 non-infringement verdict rests on ample evidence properly 10 applying all of the Court's claim constructions. Now, Mr. Dovel started out by talking about the 11 Shows Fifth Circuit case from 1982. The standard is set 12 13 forth in the Dawson case that is quoted on Slide 2 of this 14 deck. 15 The verdict must be affirmed unless the evidence 16 points so strongly and overwhelmingly in Network-1's favor 17 that the Court believes that reasonable persons could not 18 arrive at a contrary conclusion. 19 For the reasons we have explained in the papers and 20 for the reasons I will explain now, Network-1 falls far short 21 of the standard laid out in Dawson. 22 Now, as Your Honor knows, Network-1 bears the 23 burden of proving infringement. And despite the fact that HP

bears no burden on infringement, HP conclusively established

at trial that three separate patent claim elements are

24

25

missing from every one of HP's products.

Mr. Dovel just spent the entirety of his presentation on the third element, low level current. It is, as set forth in detail in our brief, two other claim elements are missing. We conclusively established that.

I will start with the first element, which is the phrase "delivering a low level current from said main power source."

This is an example of where this phrase appears.

It is in Claim 6 of the '930 patent. This term appears in all of the asserted claims. There is no dispute about that.

Now, I will talk about low level current separately, and I will talk about main power source separately. But the Court has not construed the phrase "from said main power source." In fact, this was raised during claim construction, and the Court found that the term "from said main power source" requires no construction. It is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning to persons of skill in the art.

At trial HP's non-infringement expert Dr. Davis presented this demonstrative to the jury. And as a quick aside, Mr. Dovel earlier mentioned that Dr. Neikirk was our non-infringement expert. I know that is late in the day. That's simply incorrect. Dr. Davis is our non-infringement expert. Dr. Neikirk testified at trial on the issue of

invalidity.

In Dr. Davis's slide on the left side, Dr. Davis shows an excerpt of Claim 6. The top portion is highlighted in teal. The bottom portion is highlighted in yellow. And these are the two requirements in the claim of the term "main power source." I will be focusing on the bottom requirement, which requires that delivering a low level current from said main power source to the access device.

That's represented by the yellow dashed line in the figure right below the claim language. And, as Your Honor can see here, the power source box 16 on the left side, there is a yellow line extending from that. That represents that the low level current must be delivered from the main power source.

Now, on the right side of this figure is how HP switches work, and I will show you the testimony that supports this in a moment.

But as the jury heard at trial, there are separate boards on HP's Power over Ethernet switches. On the bottom left is the power supply board. And on the power supply board are multiple power supplies.

On the right side is the PoE board, the Power over Ethernet board. And on the PoE board are PoE chips. It is from those chips the detection currents, the alleged low level current, are generated and delivered. They are never

delivered from any of the power supplies. In fact, they don't even exist at the power supplies.

You don't have to take my word for it. Every one of our three witnesses that we put up on this, supported that the detection current in HP's switches, in every one of HP's switches is never delivered from the main power source. It is always delivered from a PoE chip.

This is Mr. Tremblay. He is HP's resident expert on Power over Ethernet. He is a distinguished technologist. Mr. Tremblay testified that the detection and the classification currents are coming out of this Power over Ethernet chip.

And just backing up, the PoE chip he is referring to is the PoE chip on the board on the right side as shown here in Slide 7.

He said it is coming out of this Power over

Ethernet chip, which here's one of them. There are two of
them. And that's where the detection voltages originate
from.

The PoE chip creates the detection currents and delivers them to what is on the other side of the cable.

They don't exist at the power supply. They don't exist at any of the power sources, and, therefore, they cannot be delivered from any power supply or power source. This is true of every one of HP's accused Power over Ethernet

switches.

This is Mr. Tremblay again on cross-examination.

Mr. Dovel asked him a specific question as to whether the detection currents come from a power supply or not.

QUESTION: As you understand it, the detection current comes from a power supply of some kind, right? We don't have to debate that. It's from some kind of power supply, right?

ANSWER: The detection currents come from a Power over Ethernet chip or controller.

Your Honor, there is no dispute in this case that a Power over Ethernet chip is not a power supply. It is not a power source. A controller is not a power supply, and a controller is not a power source. Again, there is no dispute about that.

Mr. Tremblay wasn't alone. We also put up
Mr. Dwelley. Mr. Dwelley spent 29 years at Lanier
Technologies developing and overseeing the design of Power
over Ethernet chips, the kind of chips that go into HP's
products, the kind of chips that go into HP's competitors'
products.

QUESTION: Are you saying that the detection currents themselves are actually generated in the Linear chip?

ANSWER: That's correct.

Now, it's not just Linear's chips that generate and deliver the detection currents. Mr. Dwelley testified that the PoE chips that are made by Linear's competitors work essentially the same way in terms of how they generate currents, in terms of how they deliver detection currents.

All of these PoE chips used in HP's switches generate and deliver detection currents. They don't come from any power source. They don't come from any power supply, and that is what the claim requires. Our products work a very different way.

The same with Dr. Davis. Looking at the bottom of question and answer here: That is what delivers the detection currents?

Yes.

He is referring to the Power over Ethernet chip as shown in the top  ${\tt Q}$  and  ${\tt A}$  here.

Now, Mr. Dovel didn't address this claim limitation at all today. Network-1 didn't address this claim limitation at all in its opening brief. The first time it addressed this claim limitation is in its reply brief, post-trial.

And what Network-1 said is HP asserts that in its switches, a downstream PoE chip limits the current delivered from an upstream power source. That is simply not what we said. And Mr. Dwelley's testimony here exemplifies that.

QUESTION: Are you saying that the detection

currents themselves are actually generated in the Linear chip?

ANSWER: That's correct.

Mr. Dwelley is not saying that the PoE chip limits the current. He is saying it generates and delivers the current.

Network-1 also argued: This narrowing limitation rejected by the Court is what HP asserts as a basis for non-infringement; that a main power source must be where the detection current is created.

Again, that is simply not correct. Our witnesses all testified that the PoE chip delivers the detection current. And they followed the exact language of Claim 6 that the low level current be delivered from the main power source.

Along the way they surely testified about where it is generated and where it is created. That wasn't the basis for non-infringement. The basis for non-infringement is that our products don't deliver detection currents from a power source or power supply of any kind. And you can see that in Dr. Davis's testimony here.

Now, Network-1 on this point seems to reference that somehow HP is barred from talking about where these detection currents are created or generated. And it references one of the Court's claim constructions for that

proposition.

A review of that Markman order will show that they are incorrect about that. But, you know, their own expert Dr. Knox, his own testimony defeats that argument. Dr. Knox stated, quote: One of the requirements, one of the steps, if you will, of this claim is that we need to deliver a low level current. In other words, we have to have a low level current from the main power source. That's where it has to originate.

Their own expert Dr. Knox takes the position that delivering a low level current from a main power source means that the low level current has to originate from the main power source. So their argument fails for that additional reason.

On that first point I want to emphasize something because it is important. Network-1 bears the burden of proving infringement. You will see no evidence either in their briefing or today from Mr. Dovel, you will see no competent evidence that in any of HP's products a detection current is delivered from a power source or a power supply of any kind. They simply don't have that.

At best they have a misplaced analogy from their expert Dr. Knox. But that is not the way that our products work. And we have just shown that from testimony from three separate witnesses. For that reason alone Network-1's motion

should be denied.

For a second reason, there is no main power source in any of our switches. And for the second reason their motion should be denied as well, and I will explain.

We looked at this demonstrative. The power source box 16 on the left has to do two things according to every one of the asserted claims. We talked about one of the requirements, the yellow one, delivering a low level current from the main power source.

That is not the only requirement. There is a second one. The power source also has to be connected to supply power to the data node.

And you can see on the right that in every one of HP's switches there are two separate power supplies shown in teal and orange on the left side. Neither one of those power sources does both of these claim requirements.

This is Mr. Dowling. He is the vice president of engineering at Hewlett-Packard.

QUESTION: Is there one power supply that powers both the switchboard and the PoE board in the HP Power over Ethernet switches?

ANSWER: No.

This is Mr. Tremblay, HP's resident expert on PoE.

QUESTION: Is there any one PoE switch that

Hewlett-Packard makes where one power supply provides power

both to the switch circuitry and also delivers the detection 1 2 current? 3 ANSWER: No, ma'am, there is no power supply that can do that. 4 5 Mr. Tremblay again. But not one of those would do the functions of powering the data node and delivering 6 7 detection current? ANSWER: Absolutely not. There is no way that one 8 9 power source can do both of those functions. 10 Now, during trial Dr. Knox, Network-1's expert, at 11 times drew a big red box around multiple power supplies and called them one power supply. And our expert addressed that. 12 13 Dr. Davis testified about that specifically. 14 He was asked: 15 QUESTION: Dr. Knox has at times suggested that the 16 12-volt and 50-volt power sources are really just one power 17 source with two outputs? 18 ANSWER: He is not correct that this represents one 19 power supply, no. 20 He went on to explain. 21 Why not? 22 The 12-volt power supply and the 50 volt-power supply are isolated from one another. 23 24 What does that mean? 25 They're isolated so that the voltages and the

1 currents on one supply can't interact with the voltages and 2 currents on the other one, primarily for safety. 3 Their own expert agreed with this in his deposition. And this came out at trial. So this is 4 5 Mr. Ferguson asking Dr. Knox. Okay -- this is me asking you -- if we look back at 6 7 what's on the power supply board, is it true that there are 8 two separate power supplies on that board? You say -- and 9 you kind of chuckled -- there are actually about eight. Do 10 you recall that? 11 ANSWER: I do. 12 QUESTION: But one of them, though, sends out 13 12-volt output, right? 14 ANSWER: That's correct. 15 QUESTION: And another of them sends out this 16 nominal 48- to 52-volt output, right? 17 ANSWER: That's correct. 18 Dr. Knox, their own expert, admitted that on our 19 power supply boards it is not one power supply, it is 20 multiples power supplies, none of which performs both 21 requirements of the claims of the main power source. 22 Now, Network-1 in its reply brief states, quote: 23 Undisputed evidence demonstrates that two categories of

accused HP switches use a single power supply that performs

both required functions of the main power source.

24

25

That is simply incorrect. Here is a quote from 1 2 Mr. Dowling, question and answer, in which Mr. Dowling talks 3 about all of HP's switches, not just some of them. QUESTION: Is there one power supply that powers 4 5 both the switchboard and the PoE board in the HP Power over Ethernet switches? 6 7 ANSWER: No. He is not talking about some of the power supplies, 8 9 as Network-1 suggests. He is talking about all of them. 10 That is true of Mr. Tremblay as well. 11 QUESTION: Is there any one PoE switch that 12 Hewlett-Packard makes where one power supply provides power 13 both to the switch circuitry and also delivers the detection 14 current? 15 ANSWER: No, ma'am, there is no power supply that 16 could do that. 17 He is talking about all of HP's accused products, 18 not just some of them. 19 Network-1 also states -- not today but in its 20 briefing -- if HP's single internal power supply were 21 actually two power supplies, HP would certainly have at least 22 one document supporting that fact. 23 The truth is we do have a document supporting that 24 fact, and we put it in front of the jury at trial. We

testified extensively about it. HP Power over Ethernet

25

Planning and Implementation Guide. And here is a quote from it. Quote: One supply voltage provides power for the switch functionality while the isolated voltage provides power for the PoE functionality.

Mr. Dowling specifically was asked this question about this particular quote.

OUESTION: What does that mean?

ANSWER: That means, basically, that we have two power supplies that are isolated from each other. Two DC power supplies.

So here is the one document. Here is a document that supports our position that our products have multiple power supplies.

So that provides a second independent basis for upholding the jury's non-infringement verdict and denying Network-1's motion.

Mr. Dovel spent a lot of time today talking about no low level current. And according to Mr. Dovel, the Court has to reweigh the evidence.

HP put in extensive evidence establishing that none of our switches use a low level current that meets the Court's claim construction.

As Your Honor is familiar, the term low level current was construed as a non-data-signal current that is sufficient to begin start up of the access device but that is

not sufficient to sustain the start up.

This demonstrative was presented at trial by Dr. Davis and others. The Court's construction imposes a lower bound where start up -- where the current must be sufficient to begin start up, and an upper bound where the current must be not sufficient to sustain the start up.

This is Dr. Davis. He concluded: HP's switches do not deliver a current sufficient to begin start up of the access device but not sufficient to sustain the start up.

Now, HP's theory of non-infringement with respect to low level current is this: Our products comply with the Power over Ethernet standard. The Power over Ethernet standard specifically forbids detection currents from beginning to start up an access device. And our witnesses testified to that. I will show you some of that testimony.

But on this slide what is shown here is detection and classification currents at the bottom, are required by the PoE standard to have a voltage within certain ranges. Detection currents must be between 2.8 and 10 volts. Classification must be between 15.5 and 20.5 volts. And then the turn on voltage has to be 30 or more. That is required by the standard.

So this is Dr. Davis confirming that all of HP's devices comply with the PoE standard. And Dr. Davis also testified that the detection voltages, according to the PoE

standard, have to be between 2.8 and 10 volts.

This is a table from the standards, which was marked as an exhibit and introduced to the jury, confirming that detection voltages have to be between 2.8 and 10 volts.

Dr. Davis testified that a device, according to the PoE standard, begins to start up when 30 volts or more are applied. At that point it not only begins to start up, it also sustains the start up. That is what the PoE standard requires.

Now, I mentioned earlier, the PoE standard specifically forbids what the '930 patent requires. It forbids a device from beginning to start up without sustaining start up, and that is provided right here, and our witnesses testified about it.

Section 33.3.5.7 of the standard says: The PD shall turn on or off without start up oscillation.

We asked Dr. Davis what that means. Dr. Davis stated that this section is requiring the PD to start up and sustain start up one time when you initially begin.

Dr. Davis also testified about a specific mechanism that is used in HP's access devices called the undervoltage lockout mechanism. Here he is saying that the undervoltage lockout mechanism prevents all power, any power from being delivered to the access device unless and until the voltage associated with that power is at least 30 volts. The access

device receives no power under 30 volts. You need at least 30 volts. And detection happens from 2.8 to 10 volts. It is too low.

Dr. Davis confirms that here. Nothing is delivered to the access device until you get about 30 volts.

Mr. Dwelley is consistent with that. During the time that detection is going on, is the operational circuitry of a PD, an access device, is that receiving any power?

ANSWER: No.

THE COURT: Let me ask you this: How is that consistent with the testimony from Tremblay that under -- that some components do work during the detection phase?

MR. MEHTA: Your Honor, it is correct that during detection there is a portion of the device called the detection circuitry. Mr. Dovel showed you and I mentioned that. It contains a resistor, it contains a PoE chip, and other components.

Those do consume power. That is correct. And he showed you testimony from our witnesses where those devices consume power during detection. That does not mean, however, that the access device as a whole begins to start up. There is a reason for that.

The PoE standard specifically forbids a device from beginning to start up. It is a safety mechanism. You need at least 30 volts for the device to begin start up and

sustain start up under the PoE standard. Again, all of our devices comply with the PoE standard.

This is Dr. Davis confirming that point.

When the voltage of any current is sent and the voltage is below 30, can any power get to the operational circuitry?

ANSWER: None of it.

Dr. Davis following up on that.

If no power is going to the operational circuitry, can the access device begin start up?

ANSWER: No, it cannot.

This is Dr. Davis summarizing.

We know that the access device has got to receive the 30 volts and whatever current is associated with it, in order to turn on and begin to operate, to begin start up. We also know that that is enough to sustain its start up. But we also know that the detection voltages and the classification voltages are not enough to even begin the start up of the access device.

Now, to Your Honor's question, the testimony that Mr. Dovel showed you in his presentation today essentially rewrites what the Court's construction requires. He focused on the devices on the front end consuming power, beginning to work. But that is simply not what the Court's construction requires.

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

13

14

15

16

17

18

19

20

21

22

23

24

25

The construction is a non-data-signal current that is sufficient to being the start up of an access device but that is insufficient to sustain the start up. We are focusing on beginning the start up of an access device, not an individual component within that device. Network-1's testimony that an individual component within the device can consume some power, it is simply not germane to the construction of low level current. And so ending where I started off, HP, despite not having the burden to prove infringement, provided three separate reasons for upholding the jury's verdict and for denying Network-1's motion. Network-1's motion should be denied. Thank you. THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Mehta. Short rebuttal, a minute or two? MR. DOVEL: All right. I will do two minutes. is that then? THE COURT: That will be fine. MR. DOVEL: Appreciate it, Your Honor. I will do just one point on the main power source. HP argues that, well, we presented some testimony from our

witnesses saying that all of our switches are the same.

presented that on direct, but Your Honor should not credit

that. And the reason is on cross-examination they explained that that testimony was false.

Here is Mr. Tremblay. I talked to him about the modular switches where he admitted that all of the power from the switch comes from a single power supply.

Here is his testimony.

Would you agree that all of the power that is consumed inside that switch, whether it is for the switch or for detection or whatever, comes through that DC output of that single power supply?

ANSWER: Yes, sir.

Then I asked him this question, this is decisive,

Your Honor: Why didn't you tell the jury that in your direct
examination?

ANSWER: We did not talk about this particular power supply in the direct examination.

So what he is saying is, when I said that they all have two power supplies, I wasn't asked specifically about this one. If I had, I would have told them, yeah, it is just one power supply.

So they have testimony, generalized testimony that they have two power supplies; but when you actually look at the cross-examination, each of their witnesses, Dowling and Tremblay and Dr. Davis admitted that, no, there is, in fact, a single power supply for HP's switches that does both of the

required functions. 1 2 Thank you, Your Honor. 3 THE COURT: Thank you, Mr. Dovel. All right. I appreciate the parties' presentations 4 5 this afternoon. I appreciate your understanding with respect 6 to my scheduling concerns in the morning. So I will look 7 forward to seeing you all as close to the noon hour as possible. And we will start at that time. 8 9 All right. See you in the morning. 10 (Hearing adjourned.) 11 12 13 CERTIFICATION 14 15 I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a true 16 and correct transcript from the stenographic notes of the 17 proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the best of my 18 ability. 19 20 May 24, 2018 /s/ Shea Sloan SHEA SLOAN, CSR, RPR 21 Official Court Reporter State of Texas No.: 3081 22 Expiration Date: 12/31/18 23 24 25